Category Archives: accounting fraud

Boeing’s Accounting: Legal but Questionable

Since I’m on the hook for the pending bailout of Boeing, it is worth knowing why the company soared so much in the first place.

Below is a chart of Boeing versus the Dow Jones Industrial Average from the March 9, 2009 low to March 20, 2020.

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Look how majestically Boeing soars above the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the period from 2012 to 2019.  As usual, the rise of Boeing wasn’t due to some kind of fluke.  It was primarily an outgrowth of a accounting method that, while very legal, was questionable.

The accounting method is known as “program accounting” which allows the company to defer the costs of building planes and book the expect profits from those planes in the future,  in the current period.  It’s the usual time travelers dream except it is done with accounting.

Thankfully, there were well informed critic of this blatant fantasy world that Boeing was living in as noted in the excerpts below.

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“Rather than booking the huge costs of building the advanced 787 or other aircraft as it pays the bills, Boeing -- with the blessing of its auditors [Deloitte & Touche LLP] and regulators and in line with accounting rules -- defers those costs, spreading them out over the number of planes it expects to sell years into the future. That allows the company to include anticipated future profits in its current earnings (Ostrower, Jon. Boeing's Unique Accounting Helped Lift Profit. Wall Street Journal. 04 Oct 2016: B1.).”

“The problem, analysts and other critics say, is that Boeing's approach stretches its profit per plane into such a distant and uncertain future that it isn't clear if it will ever recover the nearly $30 billion it has sunk into producing the plane and validate years of projected profits (Ostrower, Jon. Boeing's Unique Accounting Helped Lift Profit. Wall Street Journal. 04 Oct 2016: B1.).”

“Boeing, which hasn't confirmed or denied the investigation, has defended its accounting -- which complies with generally accepted accounting principles -- and says its profit expectations are realistic (Ostrower, Jon. Boeing's Unique Accounting Helped Lift Profit. Wall Street Journal. 04 Oct 2016: B1.).”

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“For Boeing, the cost of producing the Dreamliner, which was delayed by 3 1/2 years because of design and manufacturing problems, is a thorny issue. The Dreamliners delivered so far continue to cost the company much more to make than what it charges for them, a fact obscured by its soaring financial results (Ostrower, Jon. Critical Mission for Boeing: Slashing Dreamliner Costs. Wall Street Journal.08 Jan 2014: B.1.).”

“If Boeing booked the difference between current sales and costs for each product it delivers, the way most companies do, its commercial-jet division's operating profit for the first nine months of 2013 would instead have been a $69 million loss, according to company figures (Ostrower, Jon. Critical Mission for Boeing: Slashing Dreamliner Costs. Wall Street Journal.08 Jan 2014: B.1.).”

Closing Thoughts

Sadly, many defenders of the bailout of Boeing will invoke claims that COVID-19 did the company in or that jobs will be lost.  Few of those same people will look at how this could have been avoid by Boeing management.

On Deck: NextEra Energy: NextProblem

James Grant was Right About GE

In James Grant’s book Minding Mr. Market, in an article titled “Hot Light On GE” that was originally published September 14, 1990, Grant highlights a curious thought experiment (emphasis ours):

“In the time saved by not visiting GE headquarters in Stamford, Connecticut, Jay Diamond, our associate publisher, compiled a fascinating historical table.  The information describes the parent company’s consolidated finances in a succession of business downturns, starting with 1932, which happens to be the year in which the forerunner to GECC was started.  It ends in what may or may not prove to be a recession year, pending statistical revisions, 1989.  Evolution has meant more leverage, thinner coverages, lower returns on assets, and rising contributions to consolidated income by financial activity.

Interestingly, GE’s debt rating hasn’t changed in the past fifty-eight years, even though its financial profile has.  At the bottom of the Great Depression, long-term debt was negligible, interest coverage was massively redundant, and the current ratio was better than 2:1.  In 1989, a non-depression year, long-term debt constituted 77 percent of equity, interest coverage was less than 2:1 (surely a remarkably low reading) and the current ration was less than 1:1. (Grant, James. Minding Mr. Market. Times Book, Random House. 1993. page 362).”

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Grant goes on to explore the various rationales given by ratings agencies as to why GE could maintain a AAA rating in spite of their deteriorating financial position.  What was the outcome of this erosion of financial security while holding on to a AAA rating?

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GE was rewarded with a stock increase of +1,111.97% from the September 1990 close to the October 2000 peak.  Somehow, GE couldn’t lose it’s AAA credit rating until after the March 9, 2009 low, after a decline in stock price of –83.96%.  In fact, GE’s change in credit status was effectively a marker for the bottom in the market.

The questions for today is, after the 2009 low and recovery in the stock market while GE sinks to the lowest level in 24 years, do we think that GE has more problems that have not been revealed since September 1990?  Will the recent accusation of GE committing accounting fraud be the marker for the top after the long run-up in the market since 2009?

See also: Andrew Left is Wrong About GE

Andrew Left is Wrong About GE

Summary

  • General Electric has been in decline at least since 2000.
  • After 19 years of persistent decline, Harry Markopolos claims that GE is committing accounting fraud.
  • GE offers up their defense of the Markopolos charges saying they are “meritless.”
  • Andrew Left of Citron Research rejects the assertions made by Markopolos.
  • The SEC has already said that Andrew Left is wrong about GE.

Review

On August 28, 2000, the closing high for General Electric (GE) was $57.69.  On August 14, 2019, the closing price for General Electric was $9.03.

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The Charge

In a republished Bloomberg article written by Katherine Chiglinsky, Richard Clough and Jack Pitcher found at Yahoo!Finance, Harry Markopolos claims that General Electric is committing “accounting fraud.”

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The Rebuttal

For its part, General Electric rejects the claim of Markopolos and says:

The claims made by Mr. Markopolos are meritless. The Company has never met, spoken to or had contact with Mr. Markopolos, and we are extremely disappointed that an individual with no direct knowledge of GE would choose to make such serious and unsubstantiated claims.  GE operates at the highest level of integrity and stands behind its financial reporting. We remain focused on running our businesses every day, following the strategic path we have laid out.”

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In Defense of General Electric

On August 16, 2019, in defense of GE, according to Andrew Left of Citron Research:

Aggressive accounting and fraud are two different animals.  The SEC has allowed aggressive accounting for years, which has helped fuel a growing economy.  If GE was committing fraud then it has been a grand scale conspiracy by thousands of accountants, auditors, and division CFOs who have all secretly collaborated over the past 20 years.”

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Aggressive Accounting is Fraud

On August 4, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced that it had reached a $50 million fraud settlement with General Electric.  In the published press release, it was said that:

“‘GE bent the accounting rules beyond the breaking point,’ said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. ‘Overly aggressive accounting can distort a company's true financial condition and mislead investors.’”

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Conclusions

  • The decline of GE was more than 20 years in the making.
  • “Aggressive accounting” by GE stretches back to the 1980’s later leading to numerous settlements with government agencies.
  • “Aggressive accounting” beget more aggressive tactics.
  • Andrew Left has built his reputation on identify companies to short citing “aggressive accounting” as a part of his strategy.
  • Andrew Left is wrong that “aggressive accounting and fraud are two different animals.  The SEC has allowed aggressive accounting for years, which has helped fuel a growing economy...” therefore, in this instance, it isn’t fraud.
  • The 2009 settlement by the SEC with GE for using “aggressive accounting” tactics is clearly defined as fraud.

See Also: