Category Archives: bailout

Undoing The Work of Those Who Got it Right in Real Time

On August 3, 2024, Kathleen Tyson, a former central banker, said the following:

“Chinese authorities and resolution experts have been managing down the real estate bubble for over four years. The IMF is frustrated that they can’t collapse China today as they collapsed Japan in 1990. Japan never recovered. China is avoiding that trap skilfully. Growth at 5% is stable.”

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We unpack this commentary because it reveals much about efforts to end speculation in real estate and stock markets and highlights how a false narratives can gain traction in our world of revisionist history.

First, the follow-up commentary to the original posting from Kyle Ferrana:

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If “…the IMF didn’t offer to give/loan China money, they suggested that China pay $1 trillion of its own money” then the IMF only suggested a policy that China has been implementing on its own for a very long time when it come to declining markets.  So, there was no implied snub of the recommendations from the IMF.  Instead, it was simply a recommendation that will emerge on the scene eventually.

Now to the commentary of Kathleen Tyson:

“Chinese authorities and resolution experts have been managing down the real estate bubble for over four years.”

If we count back to four years ago, that would bring us back to 2020. However, we do know of the October 17, 2017 speech by Xi Jin Ping where he said that property is not for speculation.

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“…The principle was first introduced by China's top leaders at an economic conference last December, as the country sought to crack down on rampant speculative buying in its property market through a flurry of government curbs (Reuters).”

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"Houses are built to be inhabited, not for speculation," Xi said in his address at the 19th Party Congress Wednesday in Beijing.”

The October 2017 reference to the December 2016 commentary gives us the impression that the beginning policy to ease prices and end speculation began in 2016, at least.

What is the point of determining when China started “managing down the real estate bubble?”  If China is doing a great job controlling their economy and real estate market downward,  then how did it become a real estate bubble to begin with?

When and what did the government do to manage down the property market? China initially tried to suppress real estate speculation back in 2003/2004 & 2010:

  • "…since 2003 the Chinese central government has rolled out a series of regulations and policies to suppress excessive speculative investment in major Chinese housing markets so as to rein in country-wide soaring housing prices." (Jia, Shijun jiashj@gzhu.edu.cn Wang, Yourong rewangyr@cufe.edu.cn Fan, Gang-Zhi fan10@konkuk.ac.kr. “Home-Purchase Limits and Housing Prices: Evidence from China.” Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics, vol. 56, no. 3, Apr. 2018, p. 387.)
  • "On April 17, 2010, the State Council, China’s cabinet, issued new rules for lowering the temperature of its booming housing markets, which are called ‘New Ten Clauses’. According to these new rules, cities whose housing prices rose excessively fast were requested to curb irrational housing demand and real estate speculation by restricting the number of homes each household can purchase and raising the minimum down-payment requirement and the mortgage loan rate."
  • "One distinctive tool in “New Ten Clauses” is home-purchase limits (HPL afterward), which restrict the number of houses that each householder can purchase." (Jia, Shijun jiashj@gzhu.edu.cn Wang, Yourong rewangyr@cufe.edu.cn Fan, Gang-Zhi fan10@konkuk.ac.kr. “Home-Purchase Limits and Housing Prices: Evidence from China.” Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics, vol. 56, no. 3, Apr. 2018, p. 387.)
  • "Municipal governments in China established direct control of the supply of urban land in August 2004." (Peng, Liang, and Thomas Thibodeau. “Government Interference and the Efficiency of the Land Market in China.” Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics, vol. 45, no. 4, Nov. 2012, pp. 919–38.)

So how did that 2003/2004 effort to end speculation of real estate go in China?

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The impression from the chart above should suggest that though well intended, housing prices in China continued to climb higher. Worth noting is the fact that the peak in China coincided with most global real estate markets, in spite of the government’s efforts to suppress rising prices and speculation.

As is standard practice of governments at the lows, in 2009, China introduced policies to offset prior speculation curbs, which of course had no impact on the inexorable trend.

"There are two short time periods of exceptions when home purchases were encouraged. One happened in 2009, just after the global financial crises, and the other was in 2015 when the government intended to mitigate the problem of housing storage." (page 387)

Jia, Shijun jiashj@gzhu.edu.cn Wang, Yourong rewangyr@cufe.edu.cn Fan, Gang-Zhi fan10@konkuk.ac.kr. “Home-Purchase Limits and Housing Prices: Evidence from China.” Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics, vol. 56, no. 3, Apr. 2018, pp. 386–409.

The 2009 policy to prop the falling housing market was as follows:

“The central bank has lowered interest rates significantly, and the banking authority has loosened conditions on mortgage agreements, including lowering the down-payment requirements. (Clouse, Thomas. “Fuel For the Growth Engine.” Global Finance, vol. 23, no. 2, Feb. 2009, pp. 34–35.)."

After 2009, the property speculation continued as it did for much of the world.

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We’re almost certain that the government in China thought, “look how quickly the market turned based on a minor tweaking of the policy on housing.”  The conclusion must have been that if they can manage a reversal from the 2009 low, then they certainly can manage a reversal from a rising trend.

So, let’s go back to our feeble attempt at determining the beginning of the government efforts to end or curb speculation in real estate.  Remember, we said, “…the beginning policy to ease prices and speculation began in 2016…”  However, we already know that as early as 2003, China was trying to slow down the speculative nature of the property market and yet, property prices increased anyway.

This brings us back to the comment by Tyson:

“Chinese authorities and resolution experts have been managing down the real estate bubble for over four years. The IMF is frustrated that they can’t collapse China today as they collapsed Japan in 1990. Japan never recovered.”

How is it possible that the government couldn’t manage the speculation and rise but suddenly can manage the decline?  This, coincidentally, is exactly the process that Japan took in trying to deal with their property bubble. We’re reminded of the words of the great Dow Theorist Richard Russell on this specific topic in 1990, well in advance of actual total collapse of Japan.

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“History tells us that deflation has a habit of getting out of control.”

Keep in mind that, at the time, the Bank of Japan promised to end speculation in stocks and real estate before 1990.  Except, after 1990, the theme of the central bank for Japan was one of doing everything they could to get real estate back to the former levels.

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This parallel history between China in 2007 and Japan in 1989 (U.S. in 1929 & Germany in 1926) highlights how institutions think that they can alter the outcome.

Interestingly, suggesting that the IMF is the reason for the fall of Japan is a denial of Japan’s strength and weaknesses. Japan actually did earn the rise that followed from 1950 to 1989.  Also, the rise ran too high and too far.  That is how bubbles work, historically.

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Suggesting that the IMF is the reason for the decline in Japan denies all the experts who accurately predicted the subsequent crash.  Experts like Tetsuo Tsukimura, who predicted that the Nikkei would decline to 8k-6k while the index was at or above 30k.

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Or Bill Emmott, with his 1989 book titled The Sun Also Sets who suggested that “"Japan is, despite all that has been written and said to the contrary, a country that, just like any other, is affected by human nature and market forces…”

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People worked really hard for the accomplishment of analyzing the situation correctly.  To suggest that the reason for the decline of Japan’s economy was due to a global government agency like the IMF, which many agree, routinely gets their analysis and policy wrong, undoes all the hard work of those who got it right in real time.

See also:

Dexia: So What’s in a Name

In the last financial crisis, we came across a company named Cerberus Capital.  Those who started Cerberus Capital had to know the kind of connotation that would be invoked with a name based on a three-headed dog that guards the gates of the underworld from those who wished to escape.  For some, Cerberus Capital’s involvement in Chrysler and GMAC seemed inescapable for the U.S. government during their bailouts of the auto and banking industry. 

Currently, a Belgium bank named Dexia Group is attempting to find a way out of its financial problems.  Apparently, Dexia is holding an enormous amount of Greek debt that could possibly go bust.   Without a plan from France, Belgium and Luxembourg, Dexia threatens to bankrupt many towns and cities in France as well as depositors in Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Like Cerberus Capital, we wonder what is in the name.  So it should comes as no surprise when we looked up what the meaning of Dexia is.  Here are the Wikipedia definitions of what Dexia is:
Dexia is a genus of tachinid flies in the family Tachinidae. Most larvae are parasitoids of beetles (Scarabaeidae).”
Since the above definitions of Dexia was relatively obscure, we looked up what a parasitoid is.  Again, Wikipedia’s definition is as follows:
A parasitoid is an organism that spends a significant portion of its life history attached to or within a single host organism in a relationship that is in essence parasitic; unlike a true parasite, however, it ultimately sterilises or kills, and sometimes consumes, the host. Thus parasitoids are similar to typical parasites except in the more dire prognosis for the host.”
Cornell University’s Guide to Natural Enemies of North America defines parasitoids, in part, as:
Insect parasitoids have an immature life stage that develops on or within a single insect host, ultimately killing the host…”
We can only wonder if Dexia, the Belgium bank, will ultimately lead to killing the hosts, in this case France, Belgium, Luxembourg  or even the European Union as we know it.
More about Dexia from Bloomberg.com
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Slittare: Italy’s credit rating

On February 18, 2009, we wrote an article titled “When Paper Has No Value.” In that article, we highlighted West Germany’s $2 billion bailout of Italy in 1974 that was backed by the value of Italy’s gold holdings. Regarding the use of gold as collateral we said the following:
No nation wants to actually resort to this feature first, because as one nation dips its toes in the water all subsequent nations will follow in its path at ever higher gold prices. It is only the last nation in the pool, with sizable gold reserves, that benefits the most from using gold as collateral. The first nation in the pool becomes the sacrificial lamb. Unfortunately, desperate times call for desperate measures.”
We couldn’t help but notice that Moody’s credit rating for Italy was downgraded three notches on October 4, 2011 (found here). There are three primary reasons given for the downgrade of Italy’s debt:
(1) The material increase in long-term funding risks for euro area sovereigns with high levels of public debt, such as Italy, as a result of the sustained and non-cyclical erosion of confidence in the wholesale finance environment for euro sovereigns, due to the current sovereign debt crisis.
(2) The increased downside risks to economic growth due to macroeconomic structural weaknesses and a weakening global outlook.
(3) The implementation risks and time needed to achieve the government's fiscal consolidation targets to reverse the adverse trend observed in the public debt, due to economic and political uncertainties.
In Italian, the word slittare means to slide or to be postponed. This was the term that was used to describe Italy’s economic woes that led to the loan using gold as collateral in 1974. Depending on its usage, slittare encapsulates the problems faced by Italy today. The increase in long-term debt is the postponement of the inevitable and the increased downside risk to economic growth points to a further slide. The third issue mentioned by Moody’s, implementation risk, only adds to why the first and second reasons will only grow.
Like it was in 1974, Germany is currently in the position of having to buttress European nations as the “lender of last resort.” We’re wondering which nation will be the first to pledge their gold reserves as collateral in exchange for a loan to avoid collapse. It will be desperate times when a nation pledges their gold reserves for the purpose of a loan. However, when this does occur, it will set the ball in motion that will inexorably create a floor in the price of gold.