Category Archives: Northern Pacific

On This Date: The Nipper Panic

On this date in 1901, the amazing ride known as the “Nipper Panic” ensued.  this was a day that began with rumors and ended with incredible market turmoil.

Northern Pacific Railroad was referred to as “Nipper” back in 1901.  On May 9, 1901, the price of Northern Pacific went from $160 to as high as $1,000 during the trading day, before settling at a price of $325 at the close.

What brought about such a panic?  Two syndicates, supposedly working in unison to elevate the price of Northern Pacific, had a difference in opinion as to what was considered “high” and “high enough.”

However, in order to gain a sense of perspective on the Nipper Panic, we need to look at what Northern Pacific was trading at in the year prior to May 1901.  On May 3, 1900,  Northern Pacific had the following quotes (New York Stock Exchange. New York Times. May 3, 1900. pg. 11):

  • Open: $57.75
  • High: $58.00
  • Low: $57.50
  • Close: $57.75

The above data indicates that the share price of Northern Pacific rose from $57.75 on May 3, 1900 to the closing price of $143.50 on May 7, 1901 (or +148.48%), shortly before the “panic” set in (New York Stock Exchange. New York Times. May 8, 1901. pg. 11.).

The way that syndicates worked, at the time, was a group of well-heeled investors (now called “accredited investor”)* proposed pushing the price of a stock up or down by informing the public of their plans after having bought a large share of a specific company.  With this information, depending the names of the people involved in the syndicate, the general public would place their bets on the direction of the stock, either long or short.

In this instance, the involved syndicates were the Harriman and Hill-Morgan.  Initially, the Hill-Morgan and Harriman syndicates were pushing up the share increase of Northern Pacific.  However, at a certain point, some members of the Hill-Morgan syndicate felt that the shares had risen “enough” and began, in opposition of the syndicate, to sell their shares.

Meanwhile, the Harriman syndicate had automatic orders to buy any and all shares of Northern Pacific as soon as they became available.  Being such large shareholders, market makers were more than glad to have a willing buyer at any price and put the shares to Harriman.

Unfortunately, the illiquidity of the market not having enough sellers to offset buyers caused the shares of Northern Pacific to attain the $1,000 level.  The carnage imposed on the sellers/short sellers was only relieved once the syndicate participants agreed to ease their automatic buying and selling program.

This is why my econ professor emphasized that cartels don’t work in the long run (see OPEC).  Someone is always going to get greedy and ultimately reneg on the agreed upon terms (see Saudi/Russian Oil price war).  Not mentioned in that awesome econ class is that one party in the cartel will end up bruised and beaten beyond recognition while the other side could be considered a “winner” (see U.S./Canadian oil producers).

In this case, the breakaway members of the Hill-Morgan syndicate not only sold but they short-sold the shares of Northern Pacific.  The brutality of the shares rising from $143.50 to $1,000 and then closing at $325.00 had to leave a mark.

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Other data from the changes in price from May 8, 1901 to May 9, 1901:

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see also:

*Notes:

  • The topic of the "accredited" or “sophisticated investor” was addressed in our September 2, 2011 article titled “There is no such thing as a Sophisticated Investor.”

On Parabolas and Cycles

In looking at the stock price of Union Pacific Corporation (UNP) from 1980 to the present, we find the pattern of a parabolic peak and subsequent decline.  Parabolic peaks are generally alarming to market technicians because they generally indicate that a crash is coming.  Part and parcel with the idea of a crash is the view that such a stock  is either a sell or short-sell candidate, definitely not worth being considered for a long-term investment.

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Sometimes lost in this observation of parabolas is the importance of other factors that might be at work.  Observed parabolas are only as good as the experience of the analyst.  In the case of Union Pacific, we don’t believe that the mere presence of a parabola is as meaningful as the pattern of market cycles.

The rule with the above chart pattern is that no parabolic move goes unchecked.  This point has been made with the many charts that we’ve run Speed Resistance Lines (SRL) on, most recently illustrated in our April 26, 2012 chart of Chesapeake Energy (CHK) when the stock was trading at $18.10. 

In the case of Chesapeake Energy, we said that if history was any indication, the stock was on the cusp of repeating a previous pattern that suggested the stock would fall to $4.94.  After applying Gould’s SRL, we arrived at what we thought would likely be the most likely outcome ( as of January 26, 2016, CHK sits at a price of $3.19).  The work of Edson Gould helps us to assess the downside prospects of parabolic patterns in stocks.  However, the use of technicals like Gould’s SRL have their limits.

In assessing the parabolic UNP chart, we noticed a pattern that isn’t as obvious to the uninitiated.  Furthermore, it is a pattern that require a little work.  However, once drawn out, the pattern almost jumps out at you and becomes pivotal in deciding which pattern is more important, the single parabola or the repeated cycle.

Since 1980, all major peaks in the price of UNP have declined between –30% to –66%.  Below is the data that we’ve selected to demonstrate this fact (using Yahoo!Finance adjusted total return data).

Year of peak   % chg   where to from 2015 peak?
1980   -65.55%   $41.69
1983   -41.25%   $71.10
1987   -44.96%   $66.61
1994   -31.33%   $83.11
1997   -46.84%   $64.33
1999   -47.07%   $64.06
2008   -59.44%   $49.08
         
  Avg. -48.06%   $62.85
         
2015   -43.16%   $68.79

The repeated pattern of declines greater than –30% is no coincidence.  These are the apparent cycles that UNP happens to experience. Furthermore, the level of consistency for UNP to decline on average –48% over the period from 1980 to 2008 (7 data points) indicates that this is very useful in determining what is “normal” for the current decline in the stock price.  Already UNP has fallen –43.16% which is generally in the sweet spot as we believe that the 2008 and 1980 declines were outliers in especially painful recessions.

What distinguishes the difference between any stock price pattern is the history and consistency.  A stock like UNP has been around since the late 19th century to the present.  Most stock price patterns for UNP will reflect a deep seated adherence to the overall economy and investors.  A stock like CHK has been around since the late 20th century.  Any stock movement will reflect the recency bias of speculators.

Another important factor when considering the validity of a parabolic move in a stock is the relative movement of a corresponding stock index.  In this case, the corresponding index is the Dow Jones Transportation Average.  As seen in the chart below, Union Pacific has tracked very closely to what a diversified mix of related companies would do.  In fact, UNP has only recently caught up, in terms of performance, with the index that it has been in since inception.

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Finally, we’d like to close with a parabolic chart of UNP ranging from 1910 to 1987.

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This chart is dynamic because, for anyone in 1987 alarmed about a parabolic pattern, it should have indicated that a collapse was due.  However, that was hardly the optimal way to view Union Pacific with the compelling fundamentals to support the rise in the stock price over time.  This is contrasted with the absence of fundamental for Chesapeake Energy, which explains why the stock has fallen nearly –90% from its prior peak.

Gould’s SRL for Union Pacific

Below is the Speed Resistance Lines for Union Pacific (UNP) based on the move from 2009 to the present.

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Buffett Prepares His Exit

In a Market Watch article title “Buffett’s Berkshire Buyback Part of Exit Plan”, it was announced that Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-A) will buy back shares of its Class-A and Class-B shares. In the article, it was also mentioned that “the plan also essentially provides for ‘an unlimited and perpetual program.’” This suggests that the shares of Berkshire Hathaway will continuously be bought under specific conditions.
We’re in perfect agreement that the current plan to repurchase Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-B) stock along with the introduction of a select team of managers is part of the strategy to phase out Warren Buffett’s involvement in the company. However, we think that the most overlooked part of Buffett’s departure plan was the purchase of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNI).
For a long time, Warren Buffett has been outspoken against the ownership of airline shares due to “…significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money.” Therefore, it would seem out of character to purchase a company in an industry synonymous for many of the same attributes as airlines. However, the purchase of a railroad company has two significant advantages that are not afforded to most corporations in the United States.
First, a quirk in the rules for railroads allow them to not have to liquidate in bankruptcy, if that were to occur. After Buffett is gone, whoever is in charge can bumble with some derivative instruments that, for unforeseen reasons, blow up. If the blow up were large enough, it could trigger the need to file bankruptcy to get Berkshire Hathaway’s house in order. The clause in the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and Bankruptcy Act allows for railroads not to liquidate if faced with bankruptcy proceedings. This protects Berkshire Hathaway from having to sell off valuable assets while the company re-emerges out of bankruptcy.
The second significant succession strategy of a railroad has to do with what is called “compulsory mergers.” This requirement allows the ICC and a railroad that has gone bankrupt to merge with another company on terms drawn up by the ICC, the bankrupt company and the acquiring company.
Since the railroad industry, like the airline industry, is synonymous for bankruptcy, BRK gets to take advantage of the "compulsory" mergers rule under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. This rule gives the ICC "...control over formulating a plan for the reorganization of an insolvent railroad."
Knowing that bankruptcy is only just around the corner in the next economic purge, Berkshire Hathaway can absorb other rails with absolute impunity. Even better, "...Section 5 of the Commerce Act, which governs mergers of solvent railroads, give the merging carriers primary control over the formulation of a merger plan." Could you imagine structuring your own deal of a merging rail that is going bankrupt?
There is a lot of precedent for these laws in the structuring of many railroads.  In fact,  Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad and Northern Pacific Railway (independent companies before their merger) have had their days with aspects of these rules before merging. Because railroads go bankrupt often, there are many examples of how this works. In one "merger," an acquiring railroad "bought" $1.9 million of claims against the state of Florida at a cost of $5,000 from another railroad facing bankruptcy. In our examination of the topic, we have seen assets worth even more being given away for $0.00 as part of a compulsory merger. 
Because Buffett has been outspoken against the ownership of airline shares due to the general lack of profitability and high propensity to go bankrupt, it seems out of character to purchase a company in an industry synonymous for the same attributes. We believe that Buffett’s purchase of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNI) was a critical piece of the succession strategy laid down for the benefit of current and future shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway.

Citations:

  • Berkshire Hathaway 2007 Annual Report. Page 8. 2007 Report here 
  • Altman, Edward I. Predicting Railroad Bankruptcies in America. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. 184-211.
  • The Yale Law Journal. "'Compulsory' Mergers under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act". Vol. 64, No. 2 (December 1954). page 282-292
  • Bedingfield, Robert, “Top Officer Quits at Penn Central in Cash Squeeze”, New York Times, June 9, 1970. page 1.
  • Schroeder, Alice. The Snowball. Bantam Books, New York. 2008.

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