Category Archives: rating agency

James Grant was Right About GE

In James Grant’s book Minding Mr. Market, in an article titled “Hot Light On GE” that was originally published September 14, 1990, Grant highlights a curious thought experiment (emphasis ours):

“In the time saved by not visiting GE headquarters in Stamford, Connecticut, Jay Diamond, our associate publisher, compiled a fascinating historical table.  The information describes the parent company’s consolidated finances in a succession of business downturns, starting with 1932, which happens to be the year in which the forerunner to GECC was started.  It ends in what may or may not prove to be a recession year, pending statistical revisions, 1989.  Evolution has meant more leverage, thinner coverages, lower returns on assets, and rising contributions to consolidated income by financial activity.

Interestingly, GE’s debt rating hasn’t changed in the past fifty-eight years, even though its financial profile has.  At the bottom of the Great Depression, long-term debt was negligible, interest coverage was massively redundant, and the current ratio was better than 2:1.  In 1989, a non-depression year, long-term debt constituted 77 percent of equity, interest coverage was less than 2:1 (surely a remarkably low reading) and the current ration was less than 1:1. (Grant, James. Minding Mr. Market. Times Book, Random House. 1993. page 362).”

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Grant goes on to explore the various rationales given by ratings agencies as to why GE could maintain a AAA rating in spite of their deteriorating financial position.  What was the outcome of this erosion of financial security while holding on to a AAA rating?

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GE was rewarded with a stock increase of +1,111.97% from the September 1990 close to the October 2000 peak.  Somehow, GE couldn’t lose it’s AAA credit rating until after the March 9, 2009 low, after a decline in stock price of –83.96%.  In fact, GE’s change in credit status was effectively a marker for the bottom in the market.

The questions for today is, after the 2009 low and recovery in the stock market while GE sinks to the lowest level in 24 years, do we think that GE has more problems that have not been revealed since September 1990?  Will the recent accusation of GE committing accounting fraud be the marker for the top after the long run-up in the market since 2009?

See also: Andrew Left is Wrong About GE

Moody’s Investor Service: Cr*me Pays

On August 28, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that Moody’s Investors Service agreed to pay  “…a total of $16.25 million in penalties to settle charges involving internal control failures and failing to clearly define and consistently apply credit rating symbols.”

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Let’s put this most recent “penalty” into perspective.  The mortgage market ratings fiasco peaked in the year of 2006.  It was at this point in time that the truly low quality debt (the kind that anyone could easily identify as garbage) started to collapse.

In 2006, it is estimated that $6 trillion of mortgage-backed securities were issued (1).  According to multiple sources, Moody’s has a 40% market share of the ratings market (2).  This means that Moody’s issued ratings on approximately $2.4 trillion of the $6 trillion of mortgage backed debt.

Assuming that only ⅓ of the $2.4 trillion were wrongly rated, this would mean that the $16.25 million PLUS the January 17, 2017 fine of $865 million (3) equaled 0.12% of the $720 billion in alleged criminal conduct that is worthy of “penalizing” from the SEC.  All this in only the year of 2006.

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True to form, Moody’s Investor Service added that they “…did not admit or deny the SEC’s charges.”  At 0.12% of the alleged 2006 value of purported mis-ratings, that’s like saying they were making a charitable donation (or bribe, whichever fits best) to the SEC.

sources:

1."Through the mid-2000s, RMBSs and CDOs were attractive investments because even the senior tranches (those rated AAA) offered higher returns than investments in AAA corporate bonds. They also grew explosively during the 2000s. In 2006, the value of mortgage-backed securities in the United States was more than $6 trillion (SIFMA 2007). As of March 2008, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae alone had issued $4.5 trillion in RMBSs (Yoon 2008). The global market for CDOs was approximately $1.5 trillion by the end of 2005 (Celent 2005) (Rom, Mark Carl. The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Mess: Greedy, Ignorant, and Stressed? Public Administration Review.Jul-Aug 2009. p. 643.)."

2. Steven Scalet and Thomas F. Kelly. The Ethics of Credit Rating Agencies: What Happened and the Way Forward. Journal of Business Ethics. December 2012. pp. 478.

3. Matt Scully and David McLaughlin. Moody’s Reaches $864 Million Subprime Ratings Settlement. Bloomberg. January 13, 2017. accessed August 31, 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-13/moody-s-to-pay-864-million-to-settle-subprime-ratings-claims

4. Kool G Rap & D.J. Polo. Live and Let Die. Crime Pays. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CW5bVNntye4 accessed August 28, 2018.

A Footnote Become a Front Page Item

This is how we always imagined the party to end.  Somewhere and somehow, an accounting footnote known as an off-balance sheet entity or item becomes a front and center issue.

Searching the internet for a definition of “off-balance-sheet entity” you will find a fairly credible source in Investopedia.  Their first sentence on the topic says it all, “Off-balance-sheet entities are complex transactions where theory and reality collide.”

“Off-balance-sheet entities are complex transactions where theory and reality collide.”

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Looking any further on this topic and you’ll find many of the most infamous financial collapses centered around off-balance sheet entities or items, and emanating from the darkest corners of the corporate world.  So when a municipality announces their inability to pay for an off-balance sheet item, it should get you interested.