Category Archives: Richard Russell

Dow/House Price Index Ratio

On February 11, 2024, we posted the following chart to Twitter:

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What is our take on this chart?  To find out we had to regenerate the same data to the current period, as seen below:

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Russell suggests that the chart indicates that the Dow was cheap when at the lows and housing is cheap when the indicator is higher.  Can housing really be that cheap as the ratio continues to climb higher?

We don’t think so.  Instead, we think that the indicator is merely reflecting the inverse relationship with interest rates.   What we should see is the indicator ultimately getting down to the 1980 level as interest rates rise.

This highlights the importance of obtaining a full cycle before drawing any meaningful conclusions.

Dow’s Theory on Government and Markets

“Remember that the industrial and railroad stocks used in the averages are essentially speculative. Only to a limited extent are they held for fixed income by people to whom safety of the principal should be the main consideration, and their holders are constantly changing. If they were not speculative they would be useless for a stock market barometer. The reason why railroad stocks during 1919 did not share the bull market in the industrials was that, through government ownership and government guaranty, they had in a real sense ceased, for the time at least, to be speculative. They could not advance in any market, bull or bear, more than enough to discount the estimated value of that guaranty.”

-William Peter Hamilton, 4th Editor of the Wall Street Journal (The Stock Market Barometer. Harper. 1922. page 186.)

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Government’s Impact on Risk

According to Hamilton:

“It is plain, then, that with a government guaranty of a minimum return, based upon the average earnings of three years ended June 30, 1917, the railroads entered the fixed income class (page 189.).”

-William Peter Hamilton, 4th Editor of the Wall Street Journal (The Stock Market Barometer. Harper. 1922. page 189.)

Many are arguing that the government purchase of assets along the widest spectrum of risk is the cause of a more speculative investing environment.  The work of Hamilton, with the citation of rail stocks after nationalization, point to the opposite outcome, suggests that if the government is so influential then markets should become more sedated rather than increasingly restive.

Fannie Mae: The Evidence

The proof of the strength in the claims made by William Peter Hamilton can be found in the share price of the Fannie Mae and the 30-Year Treasury from 1977 to 2020.

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As soon as Fannie Mae lost the implicit guarantee and achieved the actual guarantee of government support the share price has gravitated to tracking the 30-Year Treasury.  The chart below shows Fannie Mae from 2013 to 2020 being unable to track beyond the 30-Year Treasury.

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For now, Fannie Mae has become a bond even though it is possible to vacillate between $0.50 to $6.00 (+11,000% or -91.67%).

William Peter Hamilton

Often cited by Dow Theorists Robert Rhea and Richard Russell, Hamilton was an intense follower of the writings of Charles H. Dow, co-founder of the Wall Street Journal.

see also:

Are the S&P 500 and the Dow exactly the same?

We can’t emphasize enough how we are not stock market bulls.  We simply present the data. 

In fact, we have a bearish leaning bias after critically reading the work of Richard Russell from the 1990’s until his passing in 2015.  Below we are going to take an unusual and highly suspect look at the similarities between the S&P 500 Index and the Dow Jones Industrial Average.

Revealing the Truth about the Market

Many market observers complain how irrelevant the Dow Jones Industrial Average is, lacking 470 companies and being price weighted.  However, the Dow Jones Industrial Average is the perfect conservative model for future outcomes of the S&P 500 Index.

Did you know?

From a level of 810 to 2,749, on the S&P 500, it took approximately 5,820 trading days from February 24, 1997 to April 8, 2020.  In the same number of trading days, the Dow Jones Industrial Average increased from 810 on August 18, 1966 to 2,759 by October 12, 1989.

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What the Dow Did was Staggering

If we step back from the already stunning revelation above and look at the bigger picture, there is more to this scenario than meets the eyes.  For example, our starting point at 1966, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was coming off of the biggest bull market in history.  From the low in 1942, the Dow increased from 92.92 to as high as 995.15 in 1966, a +971% increase.

A 10-fold increase sounds enticing, however, this was with the backdrop of rising interest rates and growing national debt.  For a sense of perspective on the overall sentiment at the time, the following is from Richard Russell’s Dow Theory Letter in 1967:

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It wasn’t until the economy faced the uncertainty of interest rates (fear that rates would not continue to climb) in 1966, that the market fell apart and began trading in a range until 1982 (1966-1982).

What Does This Mean?

The Dow Jones Industrial Average was a stodgy heavy industry index when it managed to accomplish from 1966 to 1989 what the S&P 500 has accomplished in the heavily weighted technology index has accomplished from 1997 to 2020.  There should be critical questions for those who claim that the S&P 500 is better than the Dow Jones Industrial Average.

Based on the data above, there is absolutely zero difference between the two indexes when put into the proper context.  For now, we have painted a general picture of how the two indexes matched performance over exactly the same period of time.  In our next posting, we explore what the future holds for both indexes.

see also:

On This Date: Richard Russell

On this date, Richard Russell of the Dow Theory Letters, said the following:

"Wall Street wisdom tells us that the most bullish thing the market can do is advance to new highs.

"Wrong--the most bullish thing a stock average can do is rally to a new high confirmed with the other averages and breadth. But that’s not what has been happening. The recent Dow/S&P highs were not confirmed by the Transports, the Utilities or the advance-decline ratio. In other words, the Dow/S&P advance to new highs was extremely “arrow, which is fine for people holding a handful of the stronger blue-chip stocks but frustrating, if not costly, for those holding a representative portfolio of stocks."

-Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters. July 29, 1998. Letter 1257. page 1.

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Primary Trend Indicator 1980-1989

Below is the Richard Russell’s Primary Trend Indicator (PTI) from inception in 1980-1989.

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see also: PTI from 1972-1979

Primary Trend Indicator 1972-1979

Below is the Richard Russell’s Primary Trend indicator from inception in 1972 to 1979.

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On This Date: Richard Russell

On this date in 1997, Richard Russell, in his Dow Theory Letters, said the following:

"The market, April through mid-June, experienced one of the most powerful rallies in recent history. As a rule, such power moves seldom end with a rise. Normally, when a power move finally ends, the market will back-and-fill, perhaps decline somewhat, but in reality it is usually building strength for the next upside assault.

"In other words, primary bull markets don’t normally end with a power move to the upside. They do tend to end with ebbing volume, non-confirmations, declining momentum, and general exhaustion of buying power."

-Richard Russell. Dow Theory Letters. July 2, 1997. page 1.

On This Day: Richard Russell

On this day in 1998, Richard Russell, in his Dow Theory Letters, said the following:

"...Another very, important consideration is this: Many wealthy and sophisticated investors are ardent practitioners of compounding. In order to compound, you must receive a return on your investment. A 1.5% return or less from stocks, compounding becomes almost impossible. But with 5.5% coming in, compounding works. For this reason, large individual investors, who are well aware of the fortune-building power of compounding, will opt for bonds rather than stocks at this juncture."

"There, I’ve given you a cold, unemotional rundown on the price action for gold. Everything else, all the rumors, all the hopes, all the concepts they’re interesting but we don’t buy and sell concepts, we buy and sell PRICE."

-Richard Russell. Dow Theory Letters. July 1, 1998.

San Diego City Building Permits

Below is a chart of San Diego City building permit from 1894 to 1989 as found in Jon Strebler’s San Diego Housing Prices, 1887-1989: The Myth of Invincibility.

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Strebler was often quoted in Richard Russell’s Dow Theory Letters and was kind enough to send us a copy of his Myth of Invincibility many years back.

1900-2020: Dow in Years Ending in Zero

This from Richard Russell’s Dow Theory Letters dated December 19, 1979:

“Note that all the zero years have started poorly and have been in a state of collapse by their 5th month (May). The single exception since 1900 was the year 1950 (Issue 772. page 2.).”

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How have the  “zero years” from 1980 to 2020 done?

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In the period from 1900 to 2020, that average percentage change has been -5.65%.  The average percentage change from 1980 to 2020 has been +0.62%.

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Not much can be gleaned from this perspective other than the zero years having below average market returns [+8.64% inflation adjusted] 77% of the time.

Quote of the Day: Richard Russell

"The problem with such diseases as influenza and HIV is that the viruses have an uncanny ability to change their makeup. Thus, the immune system is not prepared to combat the new or mutant strain. For instance, at intervals the flu virus attacks with a virulent new strain – 1900, 1918, 1957, 1968, 1977."

Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters. July 20, 1994. Issue 1152. Page 5.

see also:

Dow and Spanish Flu: 1915-1921

2015 Reprint: Consequences of Falling Oil Prices

It was merely an observation at the time.  However, we find it necessary to reprint a piece from 2015 on the outcome of falling oil prices and our thoughts about it at the time.  Please click on the image or the following link: Consequences of Falling Oil Prices

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Inventory-Sales Ratio

Richard Russell’s Dow Theory Letters dated March 20, 1970:

“Sales and Inventories: The accompany chart from the Journal of Commerce (thanks to Humphrey Neill) shows an interesting picture, the critical sales to inventory ratio. When business is expanding, and we note on the chart that the long upward rise in the FRB production index [Industrial Production Index] signifies that it has been expanding, manufacturers tend to become increasingly bullish. Consequently, they also seek to build up their inventories in anticipation of increasing business (and as a hedge against inflation.)

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“Then, as a slowdown in sales appears, it usually catches manufacturers either unaware or unable to adjust their inventories fast enough. Those who see the slowdown coming may cut back their inventory building in anticipations. This is termed to voluntary inventory cutting. But in most cases a belated recognition of a sales slowdown hits manufacturers. Then they are faced with a problem; sales are declining, and they have far too many goods coming in on order. The next step is canceling unwanted orders and cutting back on future orders. This is the process known as in voluntary inventory cutting, and it is undoubtedly happening now (page 5).” Continue reading

The Dow and Recessions

The following is raw data on the performance of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) versus the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) call of a recession from the peak to trough from 1900 to 2018.

Our aim is the determine if there is any coincidence or correlation between the two.  We’d also like to emphasize that it would be especially ideal if there is confirmation of the idea that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy.

Simple Coincidence

Below is the simple coincidence of the DJIA and NBER.  This takes the date when the NBER calls a recession or an expansion and registers the level of the DJIA for the first trading day of month that an NBER call takes place and registers the level of the DJIA when the next NBER call begins.

The times when an recession was called but the DJIA was instead higher is indicated in red.  As an example, On August 1, 1918, the NBER indicated that there was a recession until March 1, 1919.  In that same period, the Dow increased from 80.71 to 85.58.

There was no instances of an expansion period being called by the NBER that was followed by a lower level in DJIA.

Date NBER DJIA
December 1, 1900 expansion 66.43
September 1, 1902 recession 66.55
August 1, 1904 expansion 52.73
May 1, 1907 recession 83.87
June 1, 1908 expansion 74.38
January 1, 1910 recession 98.34
January 1, 1912 expansion 82.36
January 1, 1913 recession 88.42
December 1, 1914 expansion 56.76
August 1, 1918 recession 80.71
March 1, 1919 expansion 85.58
January 1, 1920 recession 108.76
July 1, 1921 expansion 91.26
May 1, 1923 recession 97.40
July 1, 1924 expansion 96.45
October 1, 1926 recession 159.69
November 1, 1927 expansion 181.65
August 1, 1929 recession 350.56
March 1, 1933 expansion 52.54
May 1, 1937 recession 174.59
June 1, 1938 expansion 110.61
February 1, 1945 recession 153.79
October 1, 1945 expansion 183.37
November 1, 1948 recession 189.76
October 1, 1949 expansion 182.67
July 1, 1953 recession 269.39
May 1, 1954 expansion 319.35
August 1, 1957 recession 506.21
April 1, 1958 expansion 445.47
April 1, 1960 recession 615.98
February 1, 1961 expansion 649.39
December 1, 1969 recession 805.04
November 1, 1970 expansion 758.01
November 1, 1973 recession 948.83
March 1, 1975 expansion 753.13
January 1, 1980 recession 824.57
July 1, 1980 expansion 872.27
July 1, 1981 recession 967.66
November 1, 1982 expansion 1,005.70
July 1, 1990 recession 2,899.26
March 1, 1991 expansion 2,909.90
March 1, 2001 recession 10,450.14
November 1, 2001 expansion 9,263.90
December 1, 2007 recession 13,314.57
June 1, 2009 expansion 8,721.44
December 1, 2018 recession 25,826.43

There were 8 instances (17%) where there was no coincidence with the call of a recession or expansion and a commensurate decline or increase in the DJIA.

The above coincidence data is graphically represented below.  The areas in red includes the the divergence of the NBER call for a recession and the DJIA along with the period that immediately followed.  This is basically showing that any recession indication that is followed by an increased in the DJIA, and the subsequent expansion calls, are not considered to be coincidence until after the last expansion and the next coincidence of a recession call.

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Naturally, this puts the coincidence level at 65% instead of the previous 83%.  This is a literal take on whether there is a coincidence between the direction of the DJIA and when the NBER actually calls a recession or an expansion.  It could be said that the DJIA follows the directions of the NBER except that the call made for the economy usually takes place at least a year after the fact.

Recession Length and Coincidence

Another method for measuring the coincidence of the DJIA and the official NBER definition of a recession is to rank the recession by length.  In this case, we take the beginning of a recession and end of a recession and use the first trading day of that month and measure to the first trading day of the month when the recession is considered to have ended. Below is the ranking of the length recessions from shortest to the longest compared to the DJIA.

NBER peak NBER trough previous expansion (months) DJIA
January 1, 1920 July 1, 1921 10 -37.16%
January 1, 1913 December 1, 1914 12 -35.81%
July 1, 1981 November 1, 1982 12 3.93%
January 1, 1910 January 1, 1912 19 -16.25%
September 1, 1902 August 1, 1904 21 -20.77%
August 1, 1929 March 1, 1933 21 -85.01%
May 1, 1923 July 1, 1924 22 -0.98%
April 1, 1960 February 1, 1961 24 5.42%
October 1, 1926 November 1, 1927 27 13.75%
May 1, 1907 June 1, 1908 33 -11.32%
November 1, 1973 March 1, 1975 36 -20.63%
November 1, 1948 October 1, 1949 37 -2.97%
August 1, 1957 April 1, 1958 39 -12.00%
August 1, 1918 March 1, 1919 44 6.03%
July 1, 1953 May 1, 1954 45 18.55%
May 1, 1937 June 1, 1938 50 -36.65%
January 1, 1980 July 1, 1980 58 5.78%
December 1, 2007 June 1, 2009 73 -34.50%
February 1, 1945 October 1, 1945 80 19.15%
July 1, 1990 March 1, 1991 92 0.37%
December 1, 1969 November 1, 1970 106 -5.84%
March 1, 2001 November 1, 2001 120 -11.35%

In this perspective on the coincidence between recessions and the performance of the DJIA, we can plainly see that there is a 63% coincidence.  Overall, not a bad amount of coincidence.  However, we think that we can generate an outcome that is closer to 100% coincidence if we twist the data to fit our agenda.

There is a saying that “the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy.”  We promise we didn’t make this up. Furthermore, we have quoted the venerable Richard Russell of Dow Theory Letters fame to prove our point.

"The stock market is an indicator for the economy, a leading indicator (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  October 4, 1967. page 2.).”

"Just as [Elliot] Janeway senses new leading indicator of the business-market condition, I too, often sense an index which I feel should be accorded great authority. Right now I would say it is world stock exchange averages (see last Letter). The leading stock markets of the world are now heading down in earnest (statistics in Barron's each week), and this has an ominous ring to it (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  August 29, 1973. page 6.)."

"...if you believe that the market is its own best leading indicator then you have to believe what this market is saying (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  September 19, 1984. page 2.)."

"I continue to remind my subscribers that the crucial issue here is NOT whether the CPI turns up or down next month, it’s NOT whether the leading indicators blip up or down in July. No, the critical issue here is the direction of the primary trend of the stock market (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  June 8, 1994. page 2.)."

For nearly 6 decades, Richard Russell impressed upon his readers that the market leads the way when it came to understanding the direction of the economy.  Naturally, William Peter Hamilton, fourth editor of the Wall Street Journal, had the following to say about the insights of the stock market:

“The market is not saying what the condition of business is to-day. It is saying what that condition will be months ahead (Hamilton, William Peter. The Stock Market Barometer. Harper & Brothers. 1922. page 42.).”

Not to be outdone, Charles H. Dow, co-founder of the Wall Street Journal, has the following to say about the stock market as a leading indicator:

“The stock market discounts tendencies. Stocks went up before the improvement in business became pronounced.  Stocks will discount depression before depression actually exists, but this discounting quality in stocks make them run to extremes.  They discount shadows as well as substances and often anticipate that which does not occur (Dow, Charles H. Review and Outlook. Wall Street Journal. May 10, 1900.).”

We have spanned over 100 years of claims that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy.  If this is true then we can then surmise that any of the years where the NBER called for a recession, the stock market had already embarked on a meaningful decline and if the data somehow shows a gain in stocks from a peak to trough period then it is because the decline and subsequent recovery was already in place.

Let’s see if the years when the DJIA registered a gain in the period from peak to trough of a recession was already preceded by a decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.

Evidence of Market Coincidence preceding Economic Reality

NBER peak NBER trough DJIA date DJIA peak DJIA date DJIA trough % change
July 1, 1981 November 1, 1982 4/27/1981 1,024.05 8/12/1982 776.92 -24.13%
April 1, 1960 February 1, 1961 1/5/1960 685.47 10/26/1960 566.05 -17.42%
October 1, 1926 November 1, 1927 2/11/1926 162.31 3/30/1926 135.20 -16.70%
August 1, 1918 March 1, 1919 6/8/1917 98.58 12/19/1917 65.95 -33.10%
July 1, 1953 May 1, 1954 1/5/1953 293.79 9/14/1953 255.49 -13.04%
January 1, 1980 July 1, 1980 2/13/1980 903.84 4/21/1980 759.13 -16.01%
February 1, 1945 October 1, 1945 3/7/1945 161.52 3/26/1945 152.27 -5.73%
July 1, 1990 March 1, 1991 7/19/1990 2,993.81 10/11/1990 2,387.87 -20.24%

Of the eight periods when there was a positive change in the DJIA within the defined NBER recession, five of them had already experienced a decline and recovery which explains why there was a positive result in our initial review.

The remaining three periods declined after the NBER recession had already started.  However, each of the three DJIA troughs occurred before the end of the NBER trough.  In this respect, even in failure, the stock market managed to fulfill half of the market bromide.  This means that 93% of the dates provided by the NBER since 1900 for both recessions and expansions were led by stock market changes in conformity with the later call in the economy.

Conclusion

In our simple coincidence evaluation, we found that only 17% of the periods did not conform to the idea that stock markets coincide with recessions and expansions.  Somehow, all available data suggests that expansions in the economy are perfectly aligned with stock market increases.

When ranked by the length of the recessions, there is a clear majority of recessions that align with declines in the DJIA.  However, the minority of recessions that show DJIA gains is somewhat confounding.

However, when we recognize that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy, we find that the remaining 17% that don’t conform to the theory that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy shrinks to 6.52% when accounting for the fact that market gains during a recession result from the market having recovered in advance of the recession low.

Dow Theory Letters Book List

Richard Russell was a legendary Dow Theorist and stock market commentator. Russell wrote the Dow Theory Letters for over 55 years from 1958 to 2015. Using Dow theory, Russell accurately called the top of the market in 1966, the bottom of the market in 1974, and the top of the market in 2007 (Barron's article November 2007.)

With such a record, we find it useful and necessary to list the majority of books that Richard Russell had mentioned in Dow Theory Letters. Some of the books related to the stock market and others are about health, politics or life in general (a small number of books added by us). Continue reading