Category Archives: risk

What If: Texas Pacific Land Trust

What if Texas Pacific Land Trust (TPL) were to retain a dividend policy that was in place from 1982 to 2016?

This means that we took the dividend in 1982 and 2016, determined the compounded annual growth rate and applied it to Edson Gould’s Altimeter until 2020.  The outcome provides an alternative view to our prior work on the downside risk to TPL and supports the claim by a commenter on SeekingAlpha.com that TPL could decline to approximately $25.

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1982 to 2013

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2009 to 2020

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How We Did it

  1. Obtained the dividend and price data from Yahoo!Finance.
  2. Deleted dividend payments that were inconsistent (i.e. extra/special payments).
  3. Calculated CAGR at MoneyChimp.com in the period from 1982 to 2016.
  4. Applied CAGR of TPL to Gould’s Altimeter.

see also:  All Prior reviews on TPL

Bitcoin: September 2019

In our June 27, 2019 posting we had a downside target of $8,530.33.  On September 25, 2019, Bitcoin achieved a low of $7,944.33.  Below is our assessment of the remaining downside risk.

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Systemic Risk: It Was Nice Knowing You

While enjoying an episode of EconTalk, we came across the following commentary:

Russ Roberts (host): And, in the area of systemic risk, which is a term that's been used a lot recently related to the financial sector, the Crisis of 2008, the issue of Too Big to Fail--how are we doing on measuring systemic risk and quantifying it?

Lars Peter Hansen (guest): Yeah. I think there we are at the very primitive stages. I'm certainly happy--that be an example where our knowledge probably is still quite meager. The term 'systemic risk' really was not on people's radar screen prior to the financial crisis. And it only became a topic of conversation among academics and policy makers prominently, after the financial crisis. Now, systemic risk, it's had a little bit of a danger of being a buzzword.

The response by the guest Lars Peter Hansen struck us as odd.  The “financial crisis” that Hansen was referring to was from approximately 2007 t0 2009.  There are some who believe that the “crisis” still isn’t over because the government bailouts only masked the hemorrhage that will ultimately reveal itself down the road.

The challenge we have with Hansen’s statement is when he said that the term “systemic risk” was not on anyone’s radar prior to the “financial crisis.”  Looking at the New York Times an Google Trends, it seems to indicate that there were some references to the specific term “systemic risk” as early as 1988, in the case of the New York Times.

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Likewise, the data from Google Trends shows a sizable initial 2004 level (233) of references to the term “systemic risk” relative to the peak in 2009 (600).  The New York Times references jumped significantly from 3 in 2004 to 82 by the 2009 peak.  Somebody was out there concerned with the concept of “systemic risk” and they were either writing or searching on the topic.

Because Google Trends “data” begins in 2004, we have to discount that the data is skewed.  However, the peak and subsequent decline in both sources suggests that, over time, the references to the term will generally mirror each other.

So far, we have over simplified the concept of whether there was awareness of the concept of “systemic risk” as it relates to the economy and more specifically the housing environment which brought about other important discussions of concepts like “too-big-to-fail” or “too-small-to-save.”  Now we will be more specific about the idea of systemic risk through a government source (OFHEO) that had the term “systemic risk” in the title of a published paper on housing.

On the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) website (formerly Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight), there is a research paper titled “Systemic Risk: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Role of OFHEO” which was published on February 4, 2003 (PDF here).  It is worth noting that as with all business or organization name changes, it was done in an effort to distance or disassociate the organization from previous activities.

This research paper, “Systemic Risk: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Role of OFHEO”, specifically commissioned in direct response to the Long-Term Capital Management debacle (PDF here), attempted to outline and identify the various stages that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac posed systemic risk to the financial system.  The goal was to anticipate and respond when and if the potential risks materialized.

What was the response to the February 4, 2003 OFHEO report?  On February 5, 2003, the president of the United States attempted to fire the head of OFHEO, Armando Falcon, and replace him with the head of a derivatives trading firm and former managing director of J.P. Morgan, Mark C. Brickell.  The firing did not take place but Falcon was ultimately pushed aside in favor of James Lockhart.  Lockhart “…lifted the safety restraints imposed by Mr. Falcon and repeatedly assured investors the companies [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] were adequately capitalized.”  We hazard to say that the rest is history, but it seems this is literally what will happen. 

First, the term “systemic risk” has had multiple permutations and a different arrangement of words that cloak modern academics and policymakers in a cloud of mystery when it comes to understanding the basic history of an ongoing problem.  As we said in our December 30, 2018 “New York Times Recession/Depression Index”:

“In our modern era, the terms ‘panic’ and ‘depression’ are no longer an acceptable part of the general lexicon to denote a decline in economic activity.  However, in the late 18th and early 19th century, they told it like it was.   in the mid- to late 20th century, the word ‘recession’ replaced the word panic or depression.”

The tendency has been for the modern world to shift the nature and use of language.  However, this shift leaves important data on the cutting room floor, potentially to never be seen again.

Second, the initial reaction to the report issued by Armando Falcon and proposing to install the head of a derivative trading firm as the replacement says all that we needed to know about how policymakers respond to the slightest mention of a solution before there is a problem.  There is little incentive to openly think about and discuss a problem when the consequences mean you cannot be in the right role at the right time to explore the risks and remedies.  The report issued by Falcon could now be view as a “how to manual” rather than a “how not to manual.”

Finally, in looking at the “data” on the word “systemic risk,” we find that the risk of it become a “buzzword” is only relative to the times and will morph and fade with all other references to the same concept with a new permutation as we have noted with the use of the word “recession” replacing the word “panic” or “depression.”

sources:

  • Roberts, Russ. EconTalk. Hansen on Risk, Ambiguity, and Measurement. June 30, 2014. link. accessed April 8, 2019.
  • Systemic Risk: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Role of OFHEO. Federal Housing Finance Agency. February 4, 2003. link. accessed February 2003.
  • Jo Becker, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, and Stephen Labaton. “White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire: The Reckoning”. New York Times. December 21, 2008. page 1. accessed April 9, 2019.
  • New York Times. “Black Chief to Oversee Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac”. February 5, 2003. page C4. accessed April 9, 2019.
  • Google Trends.  trends.google.com. “systemic risk” (United States). link. accessed April 9, 2019.

  • Proquest. New York Times Historical Database 1851-2015. “systemic risk”. accessed April 9, 2019.

  • New York Times Recession/Depression Index. December 30, 2018. New Low Observer. link.

CenturyLink’s Troubling Indicator

There are two very disturbing indications at CenturyLink (CTL).  The first is the dividend payout ratio as seen below from 1982 to 2018 as obtained from Value Line Investment Survey.

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The second troubling indication is the number of shares outstanding.  Below is the shares outstanding from 1982 to 2018.

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With CenturyLink (CTL) yielding more than some junk bonds, a long-term investor seeking income needs to beware of these two indicators (at minimum) of an unsustainable dividend policy. 

Bitcoin Review

On January 12, 2017, after Bitcoin achieved our prior downside target of $772.12, we said the following:

“Those who wish to speculate on Bitcoin should assess the risks and consider buy[ing] at [the] current level.”

Anyone who bought based on our work should have known that on January 1, 2017, we had the following upside targets:

  • $1,158.18 (conservative)
  • $1,737.26 (mid range)
  • $2,316.35 (extreme)

What is important about our upside targets, issued on January 1, 2017, is that we emphasized a downside assessment was necessary after a parabolic run-up.  We expected that the price would need to experience a large decline before any material rise could ensue.  Shortly afterwards, on January 12, 2017, our downside targets were met.

On May 10, 2017, Bitcoin has achieved a new high of $1,750.  If this level can be sustained, we think that the extreme upside target of $2,316.35 is possible.  However, we have to acknowledge the downside targets that come with a parabolic increase.

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Serious speculators (as opposed to investors) in Bitcoin should consider the inevitable decline that is to come as a reaction to the parabolic rise.  Yes, there is a good chance that our target of $2,316.35 will be achieved.  However, if, as a speculator, you have enjoyed some or all of the run-up since our January 12, 2017 recommendation, then you probably want to be able to enjoy it.  We recommend selling now and watch for the ascending downside targets.

Clean Harbors Meets Downside Target

On January 28, 2015 we said the following:

“So far, CLH has adhered to the SRL that was initially outlined in 2012.  If we consider the period of 2007 to 2009, when the stock fell as low as $20.54 and extend that same decline to the current period, then CLH could decline as low as $41.40.  This assumption is predicated on the stock market not experiencing a precipitous decline from the current level.  A broad market decline would easily bring CLH to the ascending $23.43 level in the SRL.”

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The assessment was based on our February 2012 review of Clean Harbors when the stock was trading at $64.28.  Since Clean Harbors has reached our technical target, it is now time to assess the fundamentals through a source like Value Line Investment Survey and Morningstar.  Morningstar typically gives a bearish case on a stock so if Clean Harbors has full coverage it be helpful to carefully read the negative assessment to contrast the upside review.

Western Digital Corp. (WDC)

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Gilead Sciences Inc.

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Aaron’s Inc.

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A Summary of the Risks of ETFs

Visit the link below if video doesn't appear
Can an ETF Collapse?
NLO Commentary:
It is only a matter of time before this situation ends badly.  We've been chronicling this matter for over a year.  We also believe that the "flash crash" of May 6, 2010 has its origins in ETFs.  Below are the article links to our contribution to this topic

  • Flash Crash Follies 7/24/10
  • Cloud of ETFs Looms Large 5/12/10
  • ETF Unwind Begins 9/12/09
  • ETF: Indiscriminant Risk 7/4/09
  • ETF: Mediocrity with No Pretense of Value 7/3/09 (Federal Register details of ETFs)