Category Archives: S&P 500

Diversification: DJIA vs. S&P 500

The long-standing view is that being diversified is better for the purpose of limiting losses.  the data from the most recent decline from the peak in the market confirms, for now, that diversification doesn’t matter.

DJIA S&P 500
1 day -0.94% -1.10%
2 days -4.06% -4.35%
3 days -4.27% -4.49%
4 days -4.12% -4.52%
5 days -4.77% -5.05%
6 days -5.48% -5.83%

As of October 11, 2018, and going backwards to October 3, 2018, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and S&P 500 have declined.  However, the extent of the decline defies the norms of diversification and concentration in investments.

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In all scenarios, the Dow Jones Industrial Average declined less than the S&P 500.  As an example, from the October 3, peak to the present, the DJIA declined –5.19% while in the same covered period, the S&P 500 declined –5.56%.

Conventional wisdom says that concentrated portfolios should rise more and fall more than diversified portfolio.  In theory, both the DJIA and S&P 500 are comprised with the same high quality stocks.  Therefore, the comparisons is supposed to be like-for-like.

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This brings us back to the October 9, 2007 to March 9, 2009 period, when the Dow and S&P 500 peaked and troughed, respectively.  Strangely, the more concentrated Dow Jones Industrial Average, counter to the conventional wisdom, declined less than the S&P 500.  The 3% difference seems to be small, however, the theory of diversification and its failure, suggests that the amount is huge.

S&P Earnings Trend

Review

On March 6, 2017, we said the following:

“What stands out about the current move upward is the fact that the decline went into negative territory.  While the decline wasn’t as low as we’d like, at or below the 1970 level, we have to accept that there are few times this indication went negative without a very strong recovery to the upside.  For now, we’re hedging our commentary by watching for the 2013 level before going on to the 1964 peak. However, we suspect that the recovery in S&P earnings could test the 1976 peak.”

The chart below updates the Year-over-Year percentage change in the S&P 500 earnings.

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At the time of the posting last year, the charting of the change was slightly above 0% and well below the 2013 level.  We’ve highlighted in the red line the reported S&P earnings since 2016 to the most recent reporting.  The orange horizontal line traces out the peak of 1964.

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Stock Market Context is Invaluable

As market pundits either celebrate or examine the stock market crash of 1987, there comes point when all analysis becomes a form of paralysis. Some say a crash won’t happen again while others proclaim, almost daily since the 2009 low, that a crash is just around the corner.  When posed with such a question, we always ask, what is our point of reference?

To arrive at a point of reference, we read an article that says that the S&P 500 has had it “Too good, Too Long.”  We liked this reference point as it charts the S&P 500 from 1996 to 2017.  We decided to use the same number of trading days for the Dow Jones Industrial Average going backwards from the 1987 peak at 2,722.42, which led us to the beginning of 1966.  When you contrast the price activity of the S&P 500 against the Dow Jones Industrial Average over the two periods, we get a point of reference that is all too telling.

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Our observations of the market leading up to the the peak in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on August 25, 1987 contrasted with the S&P 500 since 1996 tells us a few things that need pointing out.

First, nothing that has happened in the exact same number of trading days between the two indexes is unique.  The Dow had declines of –35%, –44%, and –26% in the late-1960’s and 1970’s.  Likewise, the S&P 500 experienced declines of –49% and –56% in the period of late-1990’s and 2007-2009.

Second, the rise from the lows could be considered to be almost equal. If we take the low of 2009 for the S&P 500 and compare it to the corresponding low in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, based on the same number of trading days, we find that the increase in the S&P 500 is not unusual at this point as compared to the Dow.  From the 1978 low in the Dow, the index gained +266% to the 1987 peak.  The 2009 low in the S&P 500 Index the gain has been +278% so far.  If we take the ultimate low in the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1974, the increase was +371%.  This puts the S&P 500 well within the range of “normal” for a market rise.

Third, looking at where the Dow Jones Industrial Average was and where it currently is, there is little to suggest that the action of the S&P 500 cannot go a significant distance above the current level with moderating declines in between.  Does the S&P 500 have to do in the future what the Dow Jones Industrial Average has done in the past?  Absolutely not!  However, looking at what has happened could help to put the coming decline in the market into proper context.  As our latest bull market ranking has demonstrated, there is still a lot of upside potential in this market. 

In reality, a market crash is always on the horizon. Also, when data is provided, if there is no context then there is no meaning or value. So, what should investors being doing now in preparation for the next crash? Our opinion is that investors should stockpile cash as the stock market increases.  Use that cash for when the next stock market decline ensues.  Educate yourself on investment values and be ready to hold your nose and buy those values at significant lows relative to prior peaks.

S&P 500 Additions and Deletions 2003 to 2016

Below are the S&P 500 Additions and Deletions from 2003 to 2016.

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Coppock Curve: Index Studies

The following is a study of the S&P 500 Index when applied to the Coppock Curve.  Our goals is to determine the period for the most optimal performance with the least amount of risk.  We provide data on the S&P 500 Index from 1954 to the present.

The Coppock Curve is one of the technical indicators that we focus on for long-term buy signals for the stock market. The Coppock Curve is only useful as a BUY indicator when the chart goes from positive territory to the negative territory then turns decidedly upward. As previously indicated, the Coppock Curve does not provide SELL signals in any way. Once the signal turns upward (while in the negative territory), investors should consider buying stocks at the beginning of the month.

The following is the Coppock Curve analysis based on the “buy” indication and the subsequent performance. We will follow this with the Nasdaq Composite in the coming days.  The review of the Dow Jones Industrial Average can be found in our June 7, 2017 posting.

Earnings Recession Over?

The chart below outlines the Year-over-Year (Y-o-Y) percentage change in the S&P 500 earnings since 1960.  From what we can tell, the slide from the 2010 peak in Y-o-Y earnings in the S&P may have bottomed in 2015 and is on a path to the 2013 peak which could be followed by the 1964 recovery peak.

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What stands out about the current move upward is the fact that the decline went into negative territory.  While the decline wasn’t as low as we’d like, at or below the 1970 level, we have to accept that there are few times this indication went negative without a very strong recovery to the upside.  For now, we’re hedging our commentary by watching for the 2013 level before going on to the 1964 peak. 

However, we suspect that the recovery in S&P earnings could test the 1976 peak.  What does that translate into for the stock market.  Although not as low as the 1975 trough, the Dow Jones Industrial Average nearly doubled within a two year period.  Let’s call for a +50% increase in the Dow Jones Industrial Average from the 2015 low.  This would bring the index to 24,153.57 by 2018.

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Lifespan of Corporations in the S&P 500

On December 4, 2014, the folks at Zerohedge.com (ZH) came out with a blurb titled “Here Is The Reason Why The Average Lifespan Of US Corporations Has Never Been Shorter”.  Overall, the ZH piece is another “…the end is nigh…” narrative that has been a consistent theme since their inception.  The ZH team highlighted the following in reference to James Montier’s GMO article titled “World's Dumbest Idea”, “...there is one point that bears emphasis: the plunge in S&P500 corporate lifespans to record lows…”.

To be specific, Montier says, “One of the other features that stands out as having changed significantly between the era of managerialism and the era of SVM is the lifespan of a company and the tenure of the CEO. Both have shortened significantly.” Also included is the following chart from Montier’s article.

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On the surface, the evidence and the claim seem to line up pretty well.  As the chart demonstrates, from 1971 to the present, the lifespan of companies in the S&P 500 has consistently declined.  However, there is one observation that stands out in the chart above. What makes it possible for the age of companies in the index to rise or fall within the range of the declining trend?

The age of the companies can increase or decrease simply because companies are added and dropped from the index.  There is no requirement that the stocks in the S&P 500 have a minimum or maximum number of years under their belt in order to be included.  Additionally, investors increasingly demand that the indexes are more reflective of the modern era rather than some bygone periods (a mistake for those who wish to have reliable index).

With this in mind, it has become the nature of the S&P 500 committee to add and drop companies with a frequency and magnitude that nullifies the point of an index.  As an example, since 2003, 37% of the S&P 500 index has been added/dropped.  The average number of companies dropped from the index is 15 each year.

In 2014, eight companies were added to the index.  According the D&B Million Dollar Database, of the companies added to the index, the average age was 19 years.  Using the same database, the companies that were dropped from the index had an average age of 64 years.

Date Added Dropped
3/21/2014 Keurig Green Mountain (1993) WPX Energy (2011)
4/1/2014 Essex Property (2007) Cliff Natural Resources (2011)
6/20/2014 Cimarex Energy (2007) International Game Tech. (1980)
6/30/2014 Affilliated Managers Group (1993) Forest Laboratories (1985; Actavis)
7/1/2014 Martin Marietta Materials (1993) United States Steel (1901)
8/14/2014 Mallinckrodt (1986) Rowan (1948)
9/19/2014 United Rentals (1997) Graham Holdings (1877)
9/19/2014 Universal Health Services (1979) Peabody Energy (1883)

As the drive and desire for performance increases, the age of corporations and tenure of CEOs in S&P 500 companies will likely decrease.  Since the S&P 500 collection of companies does not act like an index, instead merely a reflection of the whims of a speculator, investors should not be alarmed with the age of companies or tenure of CEOs presented to us by S&P handlers.  The changes that have occurred since 1971 are a reflection of overreaching on the part of the index managers.

The lifespan of companies in the index does not mean death and dissolution of companies dropped from the index.

Current Implication of Market Valuation

There's no denying that the current bull market has caught many professionals and individuals by surprise.  Many are pondering on the sideline as to when and if this bull market will ever end.

Our recent study of market return (Analysis of Long-Term Return from Equity Market) suggested that equity on average will provide a rate of return between 9% - 10%, but one should be caution of the year-to-year fluctuation.  Also, one should make a distinction between the return from the market and return to individual investor.  The ladder tend to be lower due to an error in market timing.  The biggest contributor that will determine your rate of return is the price you pay for any investment (mutual fund, ETF, real estate, or individual stock).  When we look at individual stock, there's a high correlation between them and the market.  That is, if the market appears to be overvalued and faces downward pressure, it would be difficult for an individual stock to break such trend.

This lead us to our next topic which is the current market valuation.  Where do we currently stand based on historical market valuation?  The data we've chosen to present is the data provided by Robert Shiller of Yale University (found here).  While his data set spans far beyond 1950, the inception of S&P 500, we will not be using them since we can't validate the accuracy of his conversion.

The two key elements of market valuation are price earning ratio (P/E) and dividend yield.  Let use inspect the first element, the P/E ratio.  The current market P/E is 19.  While one may say that the market is expensive, we need historical data to prove such claim.  Based on the data, the market will on average trade between P/E of 18 and 20 thus placing the current state at or near fair value.  The table below indicate frequencies in months that the market trade in specific P/E range.  At P/E of 20, the market is at 78th percentile which statistically imply that there is a 22% chance for the market to continue to advance beyond current level.

P/E Months Cumulative %
6 0 0%
8 52 7%
10 65 15%
12 78 25%
14 72 35%
16 79 45%
18 147 64%
20 110 78%
22 38 83%
24 32 87%
26 18 90%
28 18 92%
30 18 94%
32 10 96%
34 9 97%
36 3 97%
38 3 98%
More 19 100%

SP500-PE-1950_2014.jpg

Now let us look at dividend yield and its implication.  Current dividend yield is 1.9% which place the current valuation in the 80th percentile (dividend yield has inverse relationship on valuation, higher figure imply lower valuation and vice versa).  As such, there is less than 20% chance of market advancing beyond the current level.

Div Yield Months Cumulative %
1.0% 0 0.00%
1.5% 49 6.33%
2.0% 111 20.67%
2.5% 60 28.42%
3.0% 110 42.64%
3.5% 154 62.53%
4.0% 88 73.90%
4.5% 63 82.04%
5.0% 45 87.86%
5.5% 34 92.25%
6.0% 28 95.87%
6.5% 12 97.42%
7.0% 14 99.22%
>8% 6 100.00%

SP500-YIELD-1950_2014.jpg

To sum it all up, the market appears to be trading at or slightly above its fair value.  The market, however, does not simply trade up (or down) to the average then revert course in the opposite direction.  The fact that we have reached a valuation level not seen since the peak of 2007 hardly mean that the market can’t simply continue higher.  Our study simply suggests that the odd of that happening diminish with every single point increase in P/E ratio.  If we have to speculate, we would be incline to say that S&P 500 would reach 25 P/E before starting to taper off.  Even so, one need to understand the historical perspective and statistics of the market before putting their hard earn money to work at this level.

Analysis of Long-Term Return – Equity Market

Ask any market participate for their estimated long-term rate of return from equity market and majority of the time they will say 9%-10%.  That's a fact most of us know.  What market participants may not know is that the average is obtained through big volatility and market never return 10% year in and year out.  The nature of the market is to overshoot on the upside as well as the downside.

Let's take a look at the market return of the S&P 500 from the start of its inception in 1957 through 2013.  The average return for this time frame is 9% per year.  Interestingly, we rarely see returns in the range of 9% plus or minus 3% deviation.  Out of 64 years, we saw only 7 instances (11% of the time) when  the market registered a return between 6% to 12% (a 3% standard deviation).  We'd have to widen the range to 11.2% standard deviation to achieve a 50/50 split.  This mean that out of 64 years, the market had a gain/loss between -2% and 20% in 32 years.

Market 1950-2013

What does all of this mean?  Simply put, don't expect an average gain, of +10%, from the equity market in the short-term. As the chart shows, market return are nearly random with gains as high as 44% and losses as big as -38%.

Incorrect Interpretations of Market Peaks

In a MarketWatch article titled “7 Ways to Spot a Market Top” (found here), it is suggested that there are key ways to tell whether or not we are at a top in U.S. stock markets.  First, we’re going to selectively choose (cherry pick) the points that we can refute or demonstrate weaknesses.  Second, we’re going show how, even at a stock market peak, abandoning new investment opportunities can potentially be a mistake.

Starting with the first of the “7 Ways to Spot a Market Top” is the claim that:

While the U.S. stock market is trading at record highs, three blue-chip Chinese companies -- Petro China (PTR), China Mobile (CHL) and Yanzhou Coal are trading near 52-week lows, points out Brad Lamensdorf, chief investment officer of the Lamensdorf Market Timing Report. All three stocks peaked in January [2013]and have been skidding ever since. Given the key role China plays in the global economy, ‘this looks like a bad sign for US stocks,’ Lamensdorf said.

While it cuts us deep to suggest that a 52-low implies proof that a top in the market is at hand (don’t forget our vested interest on this topic), there are clear weaknesses in this argument.  First and foremost, look at the chart for the respective stocks.

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For PetroChina (PTR) the stock peaked in April 2011.  Since then, the stock has been unable to exceed the prior peak.  A technical analyst would have immediately recognized this and would not make the basis of their analysis the 2013 peak because it is lower than the 2011 top.

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In the case of China Mobile (CHL), the stock peaked in August 2012.

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In the instance of Yanzhou Coal (YZC), the stock peaked in May of 2011.  If what Mr. Lamensdorf says is true, U.S. stocks should have shown more signs of weakness before the most recent declines.  Based on the information that we’ve provided, the first of 7 ways to spot a market top is very weak at best.

The second of 7 ways to spot a market top reflects on the performance of the Spanish stock market indexes.  Unfortunately, there is no PROOF that, based on the movement of the three indexes, that we’ve seen the top in the U.S. stock market.  Instead, it only reflects on what has happened in Spain.  In addition, the time span that is used is narrow at best.  What is a better alternative to indicate a possible top in the market?  First and foremost, Dow Theory could have been a better guide for consideration of when and if we were at a market top in advance of the actual peaks.  As an example, the Spanish IBEX 35 Index, is shown below from 2006 to the present.

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From the peak of the IBEX 35 Index in 2007, the decline was down to the March 2009 low near 6,936.90.  The increase of the IBEX 35 Index could have been expected to increase at least half of the prior decline before giving clear indications of a change in direction in the market.  According to Dow Theory the best case scenario would be for the market to retrace 50% of the previous decline.

Our own example of a real-time application of Dow Theory projections in advance of a market top is our April 3, 2009 posting titled “Bear Market Rally Targets” (found here), when the Dow was at 8,017.59.  At that time, we said that the Dow Jones Industrials Average had an upside target of 10,360.02 based on the Dow Theory 50% principle.  Dow Theory clearly outlines how to interpret market direction based on the stock market movement after the retracement of the 50% principle.  Therefore, it would have been clear that the decline was in the cards and not helped by the European Financial crisis.

In our considered opinion, calling the top is easy after the fact, however the tools were in place to allow for understanding the potential upside limits beforehand.  Additionally, there is no proof that the Spanish markets have topped out, based on such a short time frame (June 2012 to June 2013).   In fact, according to the precepts of Dow Theory, the marginal top of January 2013 could not be considered to be “in” until the IBEX 35 declines below the 2012 low.

The third of 7 ways to spot a market top is based on the FTSE Europe relative strength index.  The indicator only shows the last year of movement.  The problem with this is that we don’t have a “relative” view on which to test the accuracy of this indication.  Although not the exact index and without the exact measure of time for which the indicator is at (a considerable weakness to leave out such information because we cannot independently test what should be widely available), we’ve outlined the Vanguard FTSE Europe ETF (VGK) with a relative strength indicator on a 28-period trailing interval.

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As can be seen above, the RSI has not necessarily give a clear indication of where the top in the market is when reviewed over a period from 2006 to the present.  As an example, in 2012, the two RSI peaks resulted in higher market levels afterwards.  Likewise, the RSI low of 2010 resulted in an even lower level for the Vanguard ETF in 2012.  Worse still, the early 2008 low in the RSI was much lower than the early 2009 RSI low.  However, the 2009 low in price was a staggering –58% lower than the early 2008 price for the Vanguard ETF.

Again, without the source of the RSI provided and the exact index that was used over a substantial period of time to verify the quality of the indicator, it would be difficult to suggest that the information provided was enough to prove that we could use the information to identify a market top, or bottom.

The fourth of the 7 ways to spot a market top refers to the Schiller P/E or CAPE ratio valuation of global equity markets.  Again, this view only reflects the current point in time.  It leaves out the perspective of other times in history, relative to when the S&P 500 Index was at respective peaks and troughs in history, compared to the same countries.  However, we do have a good source to help see how this may not be the top, according to CAPE valuations.

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The chart above is the Shiller P/E or CAPE ratio from GuruFocus.com (found here).  According to the chart, it would appear that on a historical basis, the U.S. stock market should trade back to the mean P/E level of 16.5 after trading to the historical peak level of 22.9.  However, there are two serious problems with this perspective.  First, it ignores the fact that at nearly 50% of the times that the S&P has been at the same level in the past, the market continued much higher than the current level in 1929 and 2000.  In the case of the year 2000, the market doubled the P/E level that we are currently at.  The second problem is that the S&P 500 index didn’t exist before 1957.  Therefore, anything before 1957 is based on a theoretical P/E ratio that is not even “real.”  In fact, everything prior to 1957 is based on the belief that an imaginary S&P 500 would have replicated the performance of the Dow Jones Industrial Average).  We’ve already pointed out the deceptiveness of P/E ratios and how they can be astronomical at market bottoms and miniscule at market tops in our article titled “P-E Ratios: Lessons from Confliction Indications” (found here).

In the fifth of the 7 ways to spot a market top, the article refers to the S&P 500 activity from 1996 to the present.  Yes, it is true that the S&P 500 has failed to exceed the prior peaks of 2000 and 2007 by a wide margin.  However, choosing the S&P 500 strictly fits the argument.  Additionally, it seems to be the point of the author that prior peaks are a indication of a market top.  However, if the Dow Jones Industrial Average were applied to the same period of time then it could be argued that you cannot pick a market top based on prior peaks.

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In each instance of a peak for the Dow, the index went higher, as opposed to the S&P 500.  Furthermore, If we looked at the Nasdaq Composite Index, then we could say, based on the flawed logic of prior peaks being the top in the market, that we’re a long way from the top in the stock market, as seen in the chart below.

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The sixth of 7 ways to spot a market top relates to the 50-moving average of the S&P 500 Index.  According to the article, Mark Luschini, chief investment strategist at Janney Montgomery Scott says:

“'As a matter of fact, with the S&P 500’s recent pullback to 1,600, it actually suggests an interim bottom,’ says Luschini. The index has bounced around and off of the 50-day moving average of 1,615, ‘so for the time being, that’s pretty good support for the market,’ he adds.”

Suffice to say, this wasn’t actually a way to spot a market top.  We’re not sure why this was included.

Finally, the seventh of the 7 ways to spot a market top discusses the price of oil but it doesn’t relate this back to the stock market as the previous 6 points attempted, somewhat.  Despite this fact, we have to point out the comment made by the analyst about the price of oil.  The article states:

“As crude gets more expensive, OPEC members have an incentive to ramp up production. But in such times, [Tim] Evans doesn’t view the higher prices as bullish.”

Unfortunately, in the chart that is included with Mr. Evans commentary, we can see that the price of oil increased from January 2007 and peaked June 2008 and collapsed to the April 2009 low.  Coincidentally, the stock market had a similar movement over the exact period of time. As Charles H. Dow, co-founder of the Wall Street Journal, said:

For the past 25 years the commodity market and the stock market have moved almost exactly together. The index number representing many commodities rose from 88 in 1878 to 120 in 1881. It dropped back to 90 in 1885, rose to 95 in 1891, dropped back to 73 in 1896, and recovered to 90 in 1900. Furthermore, index numbers kept in Europe and applied to quite different commodities had almost exactly the same movement in the same time. It is not necessary to say to anyone familiar with the course of the stock market that this has been exactly the course of stocks in the same period ( source: Dow, Charles. Review and Outlook. Wall Street Journal.February 21, 1901.)”

With this in mind, it is possible to suggest that because oil is relatively far from the peak, there may still be some upside left.  After all, in the period from 2007 to the present, whenever oil rose, so too did the stock market.  Why should we expect anything different going forward? Especially when the price for oil hasn’t exceed the 2008 peak.

Our next point is regarding the abandonment of investments if and when you “know” that the stock market has peaked.  In our posting titled “Complete 2008 Transaction Summary” (found here), we show every position that we took in 2008, the length of time that we held each position and the gain or loss for each position.  It is important to note that although the stock market was in the process of collapsing, we were able to make long only positions based on stocks from our U.S. Dividend Watch List and end the year with gains of +14% as opposed to Dow Industrials and S&P 500 declines of -38% and greater.

Another source for inspiration of investing in stocks at stock market peaks can be derived from the work of Jeremy Siegel’s article titled “Nifty Fifty Revisited” (PDF here).  In the article by Siegel, the highest P/E stocks (at a market peak; 1972) for that era were selected to determine their performance over a long-term basis (1972 to 1995). If, as a long-term investor, you’re interested in beating inflation by a wide margin, then avoiding new purchases at the peak in the market, because you think we’re at a peak, isn’t as rational as it would seem.  It might make sense if you have a well established system (that is profitable, of course) in place.  However, the work of Siegel suggests that for long-term investors, avoiding new purchases at market peak could be a costly trade off.

In our personal experience, a la 2008, we can’t suggest that our performance will be replicated again.  However, what we can claim is that, aside from dumb luck, abandoning investment opportunities because the market has peaked or is falling could be just as mistaken as calling market tops, and bottoms, based on spurious notions that are unsubstantiated.

S&P 500 Index Additions and Deletions

Update to September 2017 found here

P-E Ratios: Lessons From Conflicting Indications

When discussion of market valuation comes up, the mention of price-to-earnings ratios (p/e ratio) is often brought up to possibly explain if the market is overvalued or undervalued.  The arguments generally follow along the line of reasoning that when the stock market rises then so too will the p/e ratio which will indicated when the market is overvalued on a relative basis.  Alternatively, when the stock market is in a declining trend, the p/e ratio will also decline to historical lows allowing for a good indication of when the market is undervalued.  The point usually is that there is a correlating relationship between the rise and fall of the stock market and p/e ratios.

While the  line of reasoning regarding p/e ratios and stock market valuation is logical and can easily be demonstrated over a majority of stock market history, there have been periods when an inverse relationship between the stock market and the p/e ratio suggests a shift in market direction.  The periods of an inverse relationship should shed light on the challenges and limits of using p/e ratios for determining market valuation.  The following are examples of periods where high p/e ratios represented a stock market that either has nearly bottomed or  was about to take off and periods when a low p/e ratio indicated that the market was about to trade in a range or decline.

Starting with the first example of an inverse relationship between the S&P 500 and the p/e ratio (data compiled by Robert Schiller; S&P 500 index did not exist before 1957) was the period of 1905 as seen in the chart below.

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The short period of time that this conflicting signal occurred was followed by both the inflation-adjusted S&P 500 and the unadjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average being mired in substantial underperformance in the period from 1905 until 1924-27 as seen in the charts below.

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According to Robert Schiller’s work, on an inflation adjusted basis, the S&P 500 meaningfully broke above the 1905 level in 1927 while the Dow Jones Industrial Average achieved new heights after 1924.  Within this extended period of time from 1905 to 1927, the inverse relationship between the real S&P 500 index and the p/e ratio occurred again during June 1913-November 1914 period, where the index declined while the p/e ratio increased.  This was followed by an increase in the real S&P 500 from December 1914 to December 1915 before the overall decline continued to the 1921 low.

The low of the stock market in 1921 was punctuated with the stock market exceeding a p/e ratio of 50 times before going into deficit due to a lack of earnings.  This happened to be the time when the Dow Jones Industrial Average was at 65 before going to the 1929 high of 381 and the real S&P 500 at 83 before the 1929 high of 416, as tabulated by Schiller-S&P.

Another significant period when the p/e ratio of the market declined in the face of a rising market was January 1929 to November 1929.  During this period, The Dow Industrials increased from 296 to 381 and the real S&P 500 increased from 311 to 416, or 27% and +33%, respectively.   The chart below shows the p/e ratio for ALL S&P Industrials in the period from January 1928 to November 1929 (source: Fisher, Kenneth. The Wall Street Waltz. Contemporary Books, Chicago. 1987. page 68-69).

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This is an instance where the stock market still had plenty of room to run on the upside in 1928 and much less upside potential as 1929 was coming to an end.  The performance of the S&P 500 after this mixed signal was –80%.  In the January to November 1929 period, the Dow Industrials saw the p/e ratio decline from 19 to 14.

Punctuating the inverse relationship between p/e ratios and the market’s valuation was the period from 1932 where the p/e ratio for the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose well above 50 and ultimately went into deficit at a time when the stock market, despite the onset of the “Great” Depression, was to move higher and never look back.

The next period of a clear inverse relationship between the stock market and the p/e ratio was from 1934 to 1937 as indicated in the chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average below.

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The culmination of this inverse relationship was the 1937 peak in the Dow Jones Industrial Average which was followed by a -50% decline in the index to the 1942 low.  As the market declined from the 1937 peak, the p/e ratio for the Dow Industrials began to rise to above 25 times in 1938.  The Dow Industrials, with the p/e ratio catapulting from the low of nearly 14 times in 1937 to over 25 times in 1938, gained +50% from March 1938 to November 1938.

The next period of divergence between the stock market and its respective p/e ratio was from 1960 to 1973 when the Dow Industrials rose from 700 to 1,050 as the p/e ratio declined from 21 times to 11 times.  The Dow Jones Industrial Average was not able to meaningfully exceed the 1,000 mark until 1982.

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This same scenario has been played out in individual stocks, with the p/e ratio declining as the stock rises and the p/e ratio rising substantially as the stock declines.  Our interpretation of these significant “outliers” is that they may render the use of p/e ratios, as a determining factor of market under/overvaluation, relatively challenging.  This does not mean that such ratios cannot be useful for valuation metrics.  Instead, it suggests that such a consideration should be put into proper perspective with the understanding that there is a limit to the value that price-to-earnings ratios can provide in determining market valuation.

To us, the most important element that needs to be incorporated when considering the p/e ratio is when it didn’t seem to work as expected for the respective stock or index.  In the examples given above, the exceptions should prove to be instructive when deciding if a favorite stock or index is over-valued or under-valued.