Category Archives: SRL

DJIA: Downside Targets

Based on the nature of the decline in the market on February 2, 2018, it is worth examining the downside targets for the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA).  Below are the downside targets based on the work of Edson Gould’s Speed Resistance Lines.

Bitcoin: February 1, 2018

On December 22, 2017, we said the following of Bitcoin:

  • “We believe that there is going to be limited upside in the near term.”
  • “We think that the conservative downside target ($6,884.31) will be achieved before a new high is seen.”
  • “In all prior booms, the subsequent bust AVERAGED –70% (data found here).”

Below is the updated chart for Bitcoin along with our expected downside target.

Review: Western Digital SRL

On November 25, 2015, we posted the following SRL for Western Digital (WDC):

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Implied in the posting is that WDC would decline, at minimum, to the $49.70 level with the potential of going all the way to the $37.45 level.  Falling below the extreme downside target ($37.45) is where we always recommended consideration of the fundamentals of a stock for a potential purchase. Below is the updated price action for WDC.

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Much of the price action of WDC has conformed to the SRL which, from our experience, has been amazing in calling downside targets.  The current price action suggests considerable weakness in the stock if WDC cannot maintain the ascending $61.16 level.

The Rise and Fall of GE

General Electric (GE) appears to be spiraling into oblivion.  As we’ve suggested last year, we think that GE is going to be booted from the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA).  In this article, we’ll take a look at how GE got to this point and what might be in store for the stock price going forward.

1975-1981

It is possible that the beginning of the end for GE could have been marked by the acquisition of Utah International on December 16, 1976, in a deal that was dubbed “one of the largest acquisition proposals in the nation’s history.”  That transaction set in motion the machinations of a complex set of accounting deals and dealings from which GE never seemed to extract itself from.

In the bid to acquire Utah International, General Electric, “…was able to use the pooling method [of accounting] to help boost its profits…” For GE, the “…unrecorded asset value would be reported as a gain…” when the eventual sale of those assets came due.  Another benefit for GE would be that “…even if the assets were not later sold, their below market valuation allowed GE to understate its expenses (cost of sales and depreciation) and thereby overstate net income.”  The problem with these methods of accounting slight-of-hand is that GE would not be able to wean itself from these strategies.  In fact, this approach to acquisition and growth only increases as time went on.

Alarmingly, the acquisition of Utah International came after GE had exited the computer business.  As noted at the time, “the computer business proved too much for Fred Borch [GE Chairman & CEO, 1967-1972].  Reg Jones [GE Chairman & CEO 1972-1981] made his mark getting us out of it. Will someone have to bail him [Reginald Jones] out of Utah International?”  The combined Borch and Jones years are compared to the period from 2003-2018 during the tenure of Jeff Immelt in the chart below (using the approximate number of trading days going backward from January 19, 2018).

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The entrance into the computer business followed by the entry into the mining business was simply one failure after the other.  Adding insult to injury is the fact that the period from 1967 to 1981 was a confirmed secular bear market for stocks.  However, the Utah International failure introduced the rampant and widespread use of creative accounting which would augment Jack Welch’s [GE Chairman & CEO 1981-2001] tenure during a secular bull market that began when the Dow Jones Industrial Average was trading at the 1,000 level and peaked at above 11,000.

1981-2001

Below is the stock price of GE during the Jack Welch years from 1981 to 2001 which coincided with a secular bull market in the same period of time.

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The nature of secular bull markets often see company fundamentals improve and hopefully the stock price will follow.  As shown above, the price of GE increased more than 45 times in the period from 1981 to 2000.  However, when looking at the per share reported earnings, as provided by Value Line Investment Survey from 1982, we can see that earnings “only” increased a little less than 8 times.

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While fundamentals, stock price, and market sentiment often coincide there is no rule that the stock price has to match the fundamentals in any way, shape, or form.  However, seeing an “industrial” company’s stock price out-distance the reported earnings by such a wide margin suggests that the stock price might gravitate towards a more “realistic” mean eventually.  The perfect setup for this reversion to the mean is a secular bear market, which in our view began in 2000 to 2016 period.

It could seem that choosing the year 2000 as the beginning of secular bear market is arbitrary, at best.  However, as noted before, the well established stock market secular cycles and Warren Buffett’s November 1999 commentary of below average market performance for the 2000 to 2016 period is enough to convince us that the period in question isn’t random.

2001-2018

This leads us to the Jeff Immelt era as Chairman & CEO of General Electric from 2001 to 2017.  There could not have been a worse period to be in charge of a hobbling industrial giant that is hamstrung with well entrenched accounting methods that work against the company when the stock price isn’t in a rising trend.

Remember, when Immelt took over at GE as Chairman & CEO on September 7, 2001, the stock price was already in the beginning stages of collapse after having fallen –34% up to that point.  Even of the price of GE were to trade in range it would be bad news for the company.  A falling stock price spelled disaster for investors who were hoping and expecting a rebound to the prior highs.

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Many GE investors attribute the decline of GE’s stock price to the management practices of Jeff Immelt.  However, much of this view is simply the mistaken attribution of correlation as causation.

If Warren Buffett thought, in late 1999, that we’d be lucky to see average market returns of +4% and GE fundamentals are calibrated to do better when the stock price rises then there is no evidence to suggest that Immelt did anything that was materially harmful (actual inflation adjusted CAGR of the S&P 500 return was +2.27%).  Instead, what we’ve witnessed in GE stock price has been a reversion to the mean from the prior period of excess.

Price & Time Targets

Based on Edson Gould’s “Three Step” rule, GE has one more leg down.  In theory, this should bring the GE stock price below the 2009 low.  However, there is a lot of ground to cover for GE to get to the 2009 low and there is no guarantee that it will happen.  With this in mind, we’ll outline the previous two declines, 2000-2002 & 2007-2009, to establish any possible precedent that might emerge.

  • 2000-2002
    • The decline from the 2000 peak did not see any respite until 2002.  That decline saw General Electric fall –63%.  The period of decline lasted 530 trading days.
  • 2007-2009
    • The decline from the 2007 peak ended in early 2009 and was approximately –84%.  The period of decline lasted 359 trading days.
  • 2016-present
    • So far, the price of General Electric (GE) has declined approximately –50.62% and has lasted 381 trading days.  As seen in the chart below, GE has blasted through Gould’s Speed Resistance Lines at $25.66 and $18.32.

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From what we can tell, the price target at the ascending $10.97 level is a lock (approximately $12.18).  This would match the decline that was experienced by GE in the period from 2000-2002.  The question becomes, will GE match the decline of 2007-2009, on a percentage basis.  If so, then GE would decline to as low as $5.27.  This would fit exactly with the nature and pattern of declines expressed by Gould in his “Three Step” rule.

Time targets seem to indicated that General Electric will reach the $10.97 or $5.27 low on April 20, 2018.  The speed at which the current decline is taking place indicates that sentiment will push the stock to the $5.27 price and the elimination from the Dow Jones Industrial Average is eminent.  We see the possible replacements for General Electric in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) to be Adobe (ADBE), Expedia (EXPE), Google (GOOG) or Amazon (AMZN).  In the case of Google and Amazon, their inclusion into the DJIA is predicated on a 10:1 stock split.

sources:

  • Stuart, Reginald. $1.9 Billion G.E. Bid in Mining Merger. New York Times. December 16, 1975. page 1.
  • Smith, Gene. Acquisition Set Today of Utah International. New York Times. December 20, 1976. page 67.
  • Schilit, Howard. Financial Shenanigans,2nd edition. McGraw Hill. 2002. page 103.
  • Value Line Investment Survey. General Electric. 1982-2018.

Duke Energy: Downside and Time Targets

We’re very fascinated by the recent price activity of Duke Energy (DUK) and have decided to outline our thoughts on the downside targets that may exist for the stock.  Below we have applied Dow Theory and Gould’s Speed Resistance Lines for what we believe to be conservative estimates that may help investors avoid buying high, allow for buying low, or reduce loses.

Dow Theory says that investors should always refer back to the last time a given stock had performed the worst, on a fundamental basis, as the benchmark for estimating the prospects for going forward. 

"The point of importance for those who deal in industrial stocks is whether the capitalization of the companies into which they propose to buy is moderate or excessive, when compared with the aggregate earnings of the various concerns forming the combination in a period of depression. It is probable that consolidated companies will be able to earn as much in the next period of low prices as the companies forming the combine were able to earn in the last one; hence the very foundation of investments in industrials should be knowledge of what these companies earned, say in 1893 to 1896, making, perhaps, reasonable allowances for economies under consolidation. Where the earnings so shown would have provided dividends for industrials now active, the fact must be regarded as a very strong point in favor of those stocks (George W. Bishop Jr., Charles H. Dow: Economist, Dow-Jones & Company,Princeton, 1967, page 11.)"

If price action is a forward reflection of company fundamentals and investor sentiment, then the period from the 2003 low is the best starting point for our review.  The decline in DUK from the 2001 peak to the 2003 low was the worst decline in magnitude when the stock fell more than -70%.  We’re not suggesting that DUK will fall by that much this time, instead, we’re watching for the intermediate stages that lead up to a possible –70% decline.

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Lam Research: Downside Targets

Review

The following is the pattern of price appreciation and decline for Lam Research (LRCX) from 1990 to 2017 with the application of Speed Resistance Lines [SRL].

1990 to 1998

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In the period from 1990 to 1995, Lam Research (LRCX) increased more than +3,470%.  From the peak of 1995, LRCX declined by –87.70% by 1998.  Based on the peak at $23.92, all of the Speed Resistance Lines [SRL] achieved their downside targets.

In addition, we’ve included the scenario for if the peak in the price were to have been the $13.13 level.  We included this because much of the analysis is based on parabolic moves to the upside.  Because we couldn’t possibly know where the peak in the price would be in real-time, we attempt to take the view, “what would happen if we were wrong about the peak?” Amazingly, even if we had chosen the $13.13 peak and used the downside targets based on the SRLs, we would have seen all of them achieved and would have been otherwise pleased if only the conservative target was met.

1998 to 2003

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In the above chart, from 1998 to 2000, LRCX increased +1,789%.  in the following decline, LRCX fell as much as –87.90%. 

There weren’t many “fake peaks” to initiate “what if” scenarios.  However, let’s assume that along the way up we had run the SRL and tried to project downside targets.  Any price above $14.00 would have generated a conservative downside target that the price action later achieved.  Also note that the period when LRCX rose from $2.94 to $12.79 and then fell to $9.04 would have generated a conservative downside target of $9.72.  This would have easily achieved the downside target.

2002 to 2008

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In the period from 2002 to 2007, LRCX increased +777.67% and later declined as much as –74.56%.

Not much can be said other than all downside target being achieved of the course of a six year period.  Again, in an attempt to prove our calculations wrong, we ran the $35.40 peak to see if the $19.80 number would have been an expected downside target. In the short term, the conservative downside target and mid range targets would have been accomplished.  In the long term, from the $35.40 level to the $15.00 in 2008, the low in 2008 would have met the SRL parameters for downside targets being achieved.

2008 to 2017

Synopsys Downside Targets

Since the beginning of the bull market in 2009, Synopsys Inc. (SNPS) is a stock that has perform in line with the Nasdaq Composite Index until early 2016.  Since February 2016, SNPS has accelerated well outside of the historical trend for the stock.  While there are many fundamental reasons for excessive gains in the last two years, the gains are still excessive and therefore should, at minimum, revert to the mean. 

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The challenge with reversion to the mean is that the stock price will likely overshoot on the downside.  With this in mind we have provided the Speed Resistance Lines indicating the conservative, mid range, and extreme price targets below.

Equifax: Downside Targets

Equifax is on a tear, to the downside.  Let’s see what happened to the stock in the last decline from an all-time high and see if there is any precedence for what we can expect going forward.

2002-2009

In the period from 2002 to 2009, the price of Equifax (EFX) increased +158% to a high of $41.22.  the decline that followed brought the stock to $17.80.

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Equifax fell to the conservative downside target ($34.18) and the mid range downside target ($23.96).  At the time, Equifax had an extreme downside target of ($13.74) but somehow didn’t manage to decline to that level, in spite of the fact that the housing crisis was co-opted by credit bureaus changing their standards which materially affected FICO scores.

“…the higher the credit score, the larger the increase in serious delinquency rates between 2005, 2006 and 2007. For example, for borrowers with the lowest credit scores (FICO scores between 500 and 600), the serious delinquency rate in 2007 was twice as large as in 2005—an increase of nearly 100 percent over the two years. For borrowers with the highest credit scores (FICO scores above 700), the serious delinquency rate in 2007 was almost four times as large as in 2005—an increase of nearly 300 percent. In addition, the serious delinquency rate in 2007 for the best-FICO group was almost the same as the rate in 2005 for the worst-FICO group.(Demyanyk, Yuliya. ‘Did Credit Scores Predict the Subprime Crisis?’ . Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. October 2008. link.).”

Bending of rules towards what was considered a prime rated credit score contributed significantly to lenders justifying the approval of home loans which later failed.  With all this in mind, Equifax and their competitors should have fallen much more than they did.  In fact, under normal conditions, at least one of the leading credit bureaus should have gone out of business.

Now, Equifax has declined based on a recent hack of their data systems.  The resultant decline in the stock price seems natural.  However, given the resilience  of the stock price after the housing crisis, we have to default to the view that the company won’t go out of business but will be severely impacted in the short-term.

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Activision Blizzard: Downside Targets

Review

The following is the pattern of price appreciation and decline for Activision Blizzard (ATVI) from 1993 to 2017 with the application of Speed Resistance Lines [SRL].

1993 to 1996

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In the period from 1993 to 1996, we can see that Activision Blizzard (ATVI) increase from $0.27 to as high as $1.50 or a gain of +455%.  The decline that followed saw ATVI fall –58%, achieving the conservative downside target of $0.80 and the mid range downside target of $0.65.  Although the chart doesn’t show it, ATVI did not rises above the 1995 level and subsequently fell as low as $0.43 by 2000 and ultimately achieving the extreme downside target of $0.50 in the process.

1999 to 2003

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In the period from 1999 to 2003, ATVI rose from $0.43 to as high as $3.96, a gain of +821%.  The resulting decline saw ATVI drop –63%.  In the chart above we do note a possible scenario that the SRL is run on the stock at the $3.12 peak, assuming you don’t know where the ultimate peak would be.  In such an instance, a conservative downside target of $1.83 and a mid range target of $1.44 were calculated. 

In the big scheme of things, the conservative downside target was achieved and the mid range target was one penny short of the mark in 2002. The point of this exercise is to see, what would have been the outcome if there was an error in the timing of the calculation of the downside targets.  As we shall see, these situations are all too real with outcomes that are generally surprising. However, in the immediate decline after the $3.12 price peak, the conservative downside target of $1.83 was $0.02 cents short of the $1.85 low set in September 2001.

2002 to 2009

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In the period from 2002 to 2009, ATVI increased in price by +1,084%.  The decline that followed brought the stock down as much as –56% before a recovery ensued.  Again, we have marked off the points where an error of early use of the SRL could have been applied.  In each of the three examples, the conservative downside target was achieved.  Suffice to say, in the case of the SRL and price peaks, the conservative downside target is a reasonable point of reference for consideration of ATVI.

2012 to 2017

The price action of ATVI has seen the stock price increase from a 2012 low of $10.08 to the 2017 high of $66.16.  The gain in the stock price has been +556%.  Our SRL has the following downside targets:

Bitcoin: How Much Pain Before Fear Sets In?

Bitcoin is going through the customary pullback in the price.  The new threshold to watch for is –35.77% on the downside.  This was the amount of loss that speculators and investors were willing to accept from the June 11, 2017 high of $3,018.55 to the July 16, 2017 low of $1,938.94 before a new bull run to the upside ensued.  Most traditionalist say that a bear market starts at or near a decline of –20% or more.  At which point, it takes some time before the “investment” gets back to the previous high (example: Nasdaq Composite took 15 years to get back to the 2000 high). 

In this case, we’re not talking about a stodgy technology stock index, we’re talking about a potentially new currency mechanism which will likely supplant many existing currencies.  Bitcoin is only one among many competing to be the final choice of a new money.  However, in order to get that prize, Bitcoin will need to survive the high risk phase of speculative boom and bust.

Right now, we’re watching Bitcoin investors test their tolerance for pain as the price swoons from the high of $4,950.72, as report by Coindesk.com, to the current level of $3,390.  As we said in our August 21, 2017 posting:

“…participants will accept even larger declines if the expectation is that it will exceed the prior peak.  So far, Bitcoin participants accepted a –14.94% decline followed by a –35.76%.  In each instance, these declines were followed by new highs in the price of Bitcoin. By our rationale, Bitcoin will now fall as much as –35% and possibly more as participants become inured to the pain of loss in anticipation of new highs.”

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Adobe Systems: Downside Targets

In determining downside targets for Adobe Systems Inc. (ADBE), we have applied Speed Resistance Lines [SRL] to the stock price over multiple periods of increase and subsequent decline. Starting in the 1986 to 1987 period, we see Adobe Systems Inc. increase from $0.21 to as high as $1.69.  In the decline that followed, the SRL indicated that the downside targets from the peak price of $1.69 were as follows:

  • $0.93
  • $0.75
  • $0.56

As seen in the chart below, ADBE declined as low as $0.46 from the $1.69 high.

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Much of the decline could have been attributed to a new company and speculative fervor for the stock taking it up +700%.  However, the inevitable decline was due and took investors down –72% before a recovery was seen in the stock price.  The stock achieved the conservative ($0.93), mid range ($0.75), and extreme ($0.56) downside targets.

In the period from 1987 to 1997, we see ADBE stock price increase from the $0.46 low to a high of $9.00, a whopping increase of +1,856%.  In the subsequent decline, ADBE fell “only” –58% from 1995 to 1996.  Adobe achieved only the conservative downside target ($3.97).

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In the period from 1998 to 2002, Adobe rose as much as +1,264%.  In the decline that followed, ADBE notched a –79% drop. In this instance, ADBE achieved all of the downside targets of $18.90 (conservative), $16.39 (mid range), and $13.88 (extreme).

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The next period that we track is from 2002 to 2008.  In that period, ADBE rose as much as +474%.  The decline that followed saw Adobe slide –66%.  Again, all downside targets achieved at $33.20 (conservative), $24.60 (mid range), and $16.00 (extreme).

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Worth noting is the fact that in all cases, Adobe Systems (ADBE) declined at least to the conservative downside target. Additionally, in 3 of the four cited examples, ADBE managed to fall to the extreme downside target as established by the Speed Resistance Lines.

Is the past a fair indication of what to expect in the future?  What do we believe the future to hold?

Our take on the future prospects for ADBE stock price are that we can reasonably expect the price to decline to the conservative downside target in accordance with past declines.  However, expecting that ADBE will achieve the extreme downside target is overly ambitious at present.   After all, ADBE is a mature, well-established company that dominates several categories in their respective product lines (by a wide margin as compared to the next closest competitor).

With this in mind, after an increase in price of +881%, from the 2009 low, we have outlined the Speed Resistance Lines from 2009 to 2017.

Swiss National Bank: Downside Targets

In a posting on ZeroHedge there is mention of Swiss National Bank (SNBN) and the “bubble” that seems to be percolating in the stock.  We don’t know whether or not the price of the stock is in a bubble.  However, what does resonate with us is any sign of a parabolic rise in price.  In the case of SNBN, we believe that we can attribute Speed Resistance Lines (SRL) that are consistent with viable downside targets.

First, whenever applying SRLs, we like to find out if there has been any precedence on the matter. In the case of SNBN, we have obtained data from Yahoo!Quotes (ChartIQ), which goes back to 1995.  It is just our luck that there is a prior period when SNBN has a similar rise and subsequent decline.

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Considering that there is a reasonable amount of precedent in the stock price movement of SNBN in the period from 1995 to 1997, we have taken the liberty in projecting what the current level of price increase could result in, if history is any guide. 

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Review: Lumber Liquidator

As early as February 2015, when the stock price of Lumber Liquidator (LL) was trading at $50, we had indicated that there was a risk that Lumber Liquidator could decline below $23.47.  Since that time, LL had declined as low as $11.

In March 2015, we outlined our own theory of a coincidence indicator that would help investors know when the price of LL should recover.  Since that time, LL has fallen in line with our theory and has subsequently increased in price along with our proposed coincidence indicator.

From the low in LL stock price in 2016, we have seen the stock price climb as much as +200%.  The actual gain based on our recommended purchase price would be approximately +16% (8% annualized) assuming equal share amounts at/or below the recommended levels.

So what does the coincidence indicator say about LL and the prospects going forward?  The chart below is clear on this matter:

Review: O’Reilly Automotive

On July 5, 2017, O’Reilly Automotive (ORLY) suffered a substantial decline in share price when the company reported that same store sales decline –1.7% as contrasted with consensus expectation of +3.90%.  Below we outline the downside targets and a Coppock Curve analysis.

Craft Brew Alliance Meets Our Target

On September 1, 2016, we said the following of Craft Brew Alliance (BREW):

“Although there is no assurance that the stock needs to decline to the referenced downside targets, any parabolic move must be watch closely as entropy will kick in at some point.  In this case, we believe that the ascending conservative target [$12.57] is a lock.  With established history as an indication, the mid-range target [$10.02] looks to be a safe “bet” as well.  We’ll check back in on this as more time has passed.”

We don’t necessarily believe it but here we are, with BREW at a price of $13.15 and well within the range of the conservative downside target set at $12.57 as established in our piece dated September 1, 2016.

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The September 1, 2016 article lays the groundwork for what a person interested in BREW should look for and expect.